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CONFERENCE REPORT
THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM:
INTO THE 1990s AND BEYOND
J. Lauchlan Wash
Dean B. Suagee
Phoebe Schlanger*
INTRODUCTION
Forgive us, Lord, for sending
this petition
but we have no place else to turn.
The Junta won't answer,
the newspaper makes jokes and is silent,
the Court of Appeals will not hear
the defense appeal,
the Supreme Court has ordered us to
cease and desist,
and no police station
dares
receive
this petition
from his family.'

The number of violations of fundamental human rights in the Americas reached tragic proportions during the 1970s. The Inter-American
human rights system, however, drew world attention to the situation.
The violations against the integrity of the individual-tortures, disappearances, extra-judicial killings, and prolonged detentions without due
process-decreased as the number of democracies in the region increased. In the political environment of the 1990s, the Inter-American
human rights system will endeavor to ensure the positive rights guaranteed in the American Convention on Human Rights: the right to participate in government through freedom of speech, press, and assembly;
* J. Lauchlan Wash, J.D., 1988, Washington College of Law, The American University; B.A., 1984, University of Kentucky. Dean B. Suagee, Associate, Hobbs, Straus,
Dean & Wilder, Washington, D.C.; LL.M. Candidate, May 1989, Washington College
of Law, The American University; J.D., 1976, University of North Carolina School of
Law; B.A., 1972, University of Arizona. Phoebe Schlanger, J.D., 1988, Washington
College of Law, The American University; B.A., 1984, University of Rochester. Mr.
Wash and Mr. Suagee were the Journal rapporteurs for the conference.
1. "His Eye is on the Sparrow," in A. DORM.AN, LAst WALTZ IN SANTIAGO
(1988).
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and through voting in elections.
On November 5 and 6, 1987, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights of the Organization of American States, the International Human Rights Law Group, and the International Legal Studies
Program and International Law Society of the Washington College of
Law at The American University co-sponsored a conference on the Inter-American human rights system. The participants included individuals affiliated with the governments of member states of the OAS. Representatives of the two principal OAS organs concerned with human
rights in the western hemisphere also attended: the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (the Commission) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (the Court). Participants also included individuals affiliated with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and
with the academic community. Scholars, practitioners, and students of
international law attended the conference.
The conference presented an opportunity for experts in the field to
exchange candid opinions about the system as it exists and to make
recommendations for improvements in the future. Judge Thomas Buergenthal of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights introduced
the conference, saluting it as the first conference devoted entirely to the
Inter-American human rights system. The conference consisted of five
panels. The first panel featured an overview of the Inter-American
human rights system, explaining the institutions that comprise the system, the Commission, and the Court, and the ways in which they carry
out their missions. The second panel addressed the political context of
the Inter-American system, outlining the interactions of the OAS, its
member states, the Commission, and the Court. The third panel assessed the role of the Commission and the Court in addressing disappearances, summary executions, and torture. The fourth panel discussed the role of the Commission and the Court in addressing the
general topic of political participation while focusing on certain critical
issues. These issues include democratic elections, the right of indigenous peoples to exercise self-government, and the use of amnesty laws
in transitions from military to civilian governments. The final panel offered suggestions on how to expand the use of the Commission and the
Court and how to increase their visibility and impact.
I. THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM:
HOW THE INSTITUTIONS WORK
The first panel discussed the jurisdiction and procedure of the InterAmerican human rights system. David Padilla and Charles Moyer, rep-
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resentatives from the Commission 2 and the Court,' presented an overview of the abilities and limitations of their institutions. Amy Young,
the Executive Director of the International Human Rights Law
Group,4 provided a critique of the system from the perspective of a
practitioner.
A. THE COMMISSION
The OAS 5 Ministers of Foreign Affairs created the Commission in
1959 to promote and protect human rights in the Americas.' The Commission, an autonomous body composed of seven people elected individually for four year terms,7 meets two or three times a year. From its
headquarters in Washington, D.C., it investigates alleged violations of
2. Mr. Padilla is the Assistant Executive Secretary of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
3. Mr. Moyer is the Executive Secretary of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights.
4. Ms. Young is the Executive Director of the International Human Rights Law
Group. The Law Group is a nonprofit, public interest organization that promotes
human rights through the application of international human rights law.
5. Charter of the Organization of American States, April 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2416,
T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, Protocol of Amend., Feb. 23, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607,
T.I.A.S. No. 6847 [hereinafter OAS Charter].
6. See Res. VIII, OASOR Ministers of Foreign Affairs (5th mtg.) at 10-I1, OAS
Doc. OEA/ser. C./II.5 (1959) (providing for the creation of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights). Resolution VIII declares that "liberty, justice, and peace
are based on recognition of the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of
the individual." Id. The Meeting of Consultation considered a juridical system essential
to protect these rights. Id. The Meeting pointed to the progress of the United Nations
and the Council of Europe in codifying and studying human rights. Id. It resolved that
the Inter-American Council of Jurists should draft a Convention on Human Rights. Id.
Finally, it created a new Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Id. The
Council of the OAS approved the Commission statute in 1960. Statute of the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights of 1960, as amended, OEA/ser. L./V/II.26,
doc. 10 (1971). Later amendments strengthened the powers of the Commission and it
became a principal organ of the OAS. OAS Charter, supra note 5, art. 51(c). The
Commission was reorganized in 1979 to include separate petition procedures for complaints against parties and non-parties to the American Convention on Human Rights.
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, arts. 34-51, O.A.S.T.S. No.
36, at 1, OEA/ser. L./V/II.23, doec. 2 rev.6, O.A.S.O.R. OEA/ser. K./XVI/I.I, doc.
65 rev. 1 corr. 2 (1970), reprintedin 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) [hereinafter American Convention]. The Commission now operates under its new statute, adopted in 1979. Statute
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights [hereinafter New IACHR Statute], reprinted in OAS,

HANDBOOK OF EXISTING RULES PERTAINING TO HUMwAN
RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 117, OEA/ser. L./V/II. 65, dec. 6 (1985)
[hereinafter HANDBOOK].

7. Regulations of the IACHR, arts. 1-2, [hereinafter IACHR Regs.], HANDBOOK,
supra note 6, at 117. The Commission uses the amended regulations, adopted in 1985
for its day-to-day operations. The Commission has the power to adopt regulations consistent with its statute. New IACHR Statute, supra note 6, art. 22(2).
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human rights by any state that is a member of the OAS. 8 The definition of human rights violations restricts the Commission to the review
of actions that individuals take under color of state law or authority.,
Although the Court and the Commission recognize that terrorist activities are politically motivated, both OAS organs still consider these activities common crimes, not violations of international obligations. 10
The Commission receives petitions from OAS organs, member states,
NGOs, and individuals."' The Commission was the first inter-governmental human rights entity to grant standing to individuals. 2 To gain
standing, however, an individual must first exhaust all domestic remedies. 13 The Commission may ignore this requirement in cases where the
8. See New IACHR Statute, supra note 6, arts. 18-20 (enumerating the powers
of the Commission with respect to the member states of the OAS). Articles 19 and 20
establish separate petition procedures for complaints against OAS parties and non-parties to the Convention. Id. arts. 19-20.
9. See American Convention, supra note 6, art. 44 (requiring that petitions made
to the Commission be complaints of violations by a state party).
10. See INTER-AM. C.H.R., REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA 21, OEA/ser. L./V/II.49, doc. 19 corr. 1 (1980) [hereinafter ARGENTINA
REPORT], reprinted in I HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM Booklet No.
22, at 83 (T. Buergenthal & R. Norris eds. 1983) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS: THE
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM] (asserting that the Commission lacks jurisdiction to receive
petitions alleging human rights violations by terrorist groups). The Commission stated
that: (i) it lacked jurisdiction under its statute to investigate terrorism; (ii) its task is to
investigate only those actions imputable to governments; (iii) as a practical matter jurisdiction over terrorism would place the terrorist on an equal footing with governments; and (iv) the Commission would not contribute to the publicity of terrorist acts
by assuming jurisdiction. Id. at 87.
11. See American Convention, supra note 6, art. 45, para. I (requiring states parties to recognize the competence of the Commission to receive and act on complaints in
which a state party alleges that another has violated the Convention); Id. art. 45, para.
2 (stating that only states parties that recognize the competence of the Commission
under article 45, paragraph I may file complaints). Among the states parties, Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Jamaica, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela recognize jurisdiction of the Commission to consider inter-state complaints in conformity
with article 45; see also IACHR Regs., supra note 7, art. 23, para. I (requiring that
one or more of the OAS states legally recognize the nongovernmental entity before it
may submit a petition).
12. See generally GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE (1H. Hannum ed. 1986) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE] (pertaining to individual complaint procedures of the United Nations and European systems). Today the United
Nations processes individual complaints. U.N. E.S.C. Res. 1503 (1970). The European
Commission on Human Rights likewise receives individual petitions and has the power
to refer the cases to the European Court of Human Rights. HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE,
supra, at 133-34; see also European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, art. 25, 213 U.N.T.S.
221 (providing an optional procedure for individual petitions).
13. IACHR Regs., supra note 7, art. 34(1). As a general principle, international
law requires a showing that domestic remedies are exhausted before a supranational
court will accept jurisdiction. Id. See Interhandel Case (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J. 6,
29 (Judgment of Mar. 21) (finding that the United States had not exhausted its domes-
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domestic remedies do not function adequately."' Finally, if the Commission knows of an urgent situation, it may initiate its own
15
investigation.
Mr. Padilla explained that the Commission functions as a quasi-judicial body in the processing of petitions.1 " It follows flexible procedures,
recognizing the often impotent position of the human rights activist.
When the Commission receives a petition, a staff attorney determines
whether the case meets the prima facie requirements for admissibility.17 If necessary, the Commission solicits additional information from
the petitioner. Furthermore, the Commission allows the petitioner's attorney liberal access to the staff of the Commission at all stages of the
procedure to continue the flow of information to the Commission on
developments in the case and to perfect the pleadings of the petition.1 8
Mr. Padilla emphasized that this informality increases the likelihood of
admissibility for the petition.
tic remedies).
14. IACHR Regs., supra note 7, art. 34, para. 2. The requirement of prior exhaustion of remedies does not apply when:
(a) the domestic legislation of the state concerned does not afford due process of
law for protection of the right or rights that have allegedly been violated;
(b) the party alleging violations of his rights has been denied access to the remedies under domestic law or has been prevented from exhausting them;
(c) there has been unwarranted delay in rendering a final judgment under the
aforementioned remedies.
Id. If the petitioner cannot prove exhaustion of domestic remedies, the burden then
shifts to the government to demonstrate that the petitioner has not exhausted domestic
remedies. Id. art. 34, para. 3. The regulations do not clearly address whether the requirement pertains to administrative remedies. In one case the Commission seemed to
hint that an administrative process could constitute a legal remedy if it followed judicial norms. Case 1697, INTER-AM. C.H.R., OEA/ser. L./V/II.28 (1972); see Leblanc,
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 9 HuM. Rrs. J. 645, 651-54
(1976) (discussing the case and the principle); see infra notes 130-37 and accompanying text (discussing three disappearance cases in Honduras).
15. See T. BUERGENTHAL, II HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL
AND POLICY ISSUES 453 (T. Meron ed. 1984) [hereinafter LEGAL AND PoLIcY ISSUES]
(stating that Commission Regulations article 41, paragraphs b, c, d, and g empower
the Commission to act without any specific request or petition).
16. See IACHR Regs., supra note 7, arts. 28-47 (citing regulations pertaining to
Petitions and Communications Regarding States Parties to the American Convention
on Human Rights); id. arts. 48-50 (Non-parties) (explaining that the Commission
makes various factual and legal determinations in considering petitions). Article 29 sets
out the requirements for a petition. Id. art 29.
17. IACHR Regs., supra note 7, art. 32 (Preliminary Questions), art. 38 (Declaration of Inadmissibility). If the petition passes the primafacie test, the current practice
of the Commission is to proceed on the merits of a case without a formal decision on

admissibility.

HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE,

supra note 12, at 117.

18. IACHR Regs., supra note 7, art. 30. The individual and the government may
each have informal contact with the Commission. HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTCE, supra
note 10, at 123-24.
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Panel members, agreeing with human rights advocates in geneial,
praised the informal procedures of the Commission as a great achievement for the system. Ms. Young noted, however, that informal procedures also have a disadvantage: since they are not recorded, not everyone can benefit from them. Because some aspects of the procedure
depend on the petitioner's initiative, if the petitioner is unaware that
certain procedures exist, they remain unused. Participants at the conference suggested that the Commission establish a working group to
study the informal practices and to publish the results. Professor Dinah
Shelton19 suggested that greater consistency would improve the reliability and predictability of the system.
Once a petition is processed by the staff attorney, the Commission
communicates the "pertinent parts" to the government without disclosing the identity of the petitioner, unless he or she has expressly given
permission to do so. 20 The Commission then requests the government to

supply any relevant information pertaining to that petition.21 The Commission may ask the government specific questions to elicit details as
needed, often through the use of questionnaires or interrogatories.22
The government must reply within 120 days from the date of the
request.2 3 It may, however, request a thirty day extension. 24 The Commission may grant two such extensions, for a total of 180 days. 6 Ms.
Young indicated that this practice gave governments too long a period
in which to respond. Acknowledging that the Commission has no
means even to enforce the 180 day maximum, Ms. Young reminded the
participants that often a petitioner suffering human rights violations or
simply seeking justice may wait as long as six months for a reply.26 She
suggested that the Commission raise the standard for granting government extensions and, in any case, reduce the time allotted for

19. Ms. Shelton is a Professor of Law at the University of Santa Clara School of
Law.
20. See IACHR Regs., supra note 7, art. 31, para. 4 (requiring that the Commission keep the identity of the petitioner secret except when the petitioner expressly authorizes in writing the disclosure of his or her identity).
21. IACHR Regs., supra note 7, art. 31, para. 1(c).
22. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 48, para. e.
23. IACHR Regs., supra note 7, art. 31, para. 5.
24. Id. art. 31, para. 6.
25. Id. The Commission shall not grant extensions for more than 180 days after the
date on which the Commission sent the first communication to the government of the
state concerned. Id.
26. Ms. Young also stated that, clearly, the standard for justifiable extensions is too
lax. For example, in one case the petitioner did not receive a timely response because
the government's secretary in charge of photocopying was absent from the office. This
example, although the exception rather than the rule, illustrates the problem associated
with the standards of the Commission for granting extensions.
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extensions. 7
The petitioner receives relevant portions of the response of the government. He or she has thirty days to offer further information or to
rebut the reply.28 This process of reply and rejoinder continues until the
Commission determines that the parties have sufficiently developed the
facts for an action on the merits.2"
If the Commission needs more information, it may depart from the
usual process and initiate hearings or an on-site investigation." Parties
to the American Convention on Human Rights must facilitate a Commission visit.3' Other OAS member states have no specific obligation to
consent to requests.32 As a practical matter, the Commission cannot
make an on-site visit without the consent of the government involved. 33
In situations where the Commission learns of an imminent threat to a
person's life or physical integrity, the Commission may employ interim
measures. 34 These measures largely consist of sending letters and telegrams requesting a prompt reply from the government.3 Frequently,
interim measures compel the government to cease the violations.30 At
the very least, these messages put the government on notice that the
Commission knows of the violations.37 The panel called for stronger in27. See Norris, The Individual Petition Procedure of the Inter-American System
for the Protection of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE, supra note 12, at

118 (noting that although the regulations do not mention a petitioner extension, the
Commission would probably grant the petitioner the same extension allowed the government). The authork wonder whether the human rights practitioners would like the
Commission to continue to grant petitioners extensions equal to the extensions the government enjoys after the Commission raises the standard for the government.
28.

IACHR Regs., supra note 7, art. 31, para. 7.

29. HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE, supra note 12, at 118.
30. IACHR Regs., supra note 7, art. 43 (Hearing), art. 44 (On-site Investigation).
31. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 48, para. l(d).
32. But see IACHR Regs., supra note 7, art. 58 (stating that once a state has
extended an invitation for an on-site observation, it shall furnish all necessary facilities
and bind itself not to take any reprisals).
33.

Mr. Padilla cited an example where the Commission approached Uruguay to

obtain permission for a visit in order to conduct an "in loco" observation in 1976.
INTER-AM. C.H.R., REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGITS IN URUGUAY

1,

OEA/ser. L./V/II.43 (1978). The government refused to consent to the request of the

Commission. Id. at 2, 6-7. The Commission issued its 1978 Special Country report on
Uruguay without the benefit of a visit. Id. at 8. Uruguay eventually promised to give

consent in the near future but, as of the date of the conference, still has not consented.

34. IACHR Regs., supra note 7, art. 29, paras. I and 2 (Precautionary Measures).
35. Id. art. 34, para. 2.
36. HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE, supra note 12, at 119.
37. Mr. Padilla suggested that as an alternative to an on-site visit by the Commission, the Commission could also ask the government to consent to a visit of a staff
member. If the government grants the request, the Commission will be near the site of
the violation. If the government fails to consent, the request to visit becomes more
intimidating than the requests for prompt replies.
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terim measures in the future in order to increase their effectiveness.
At any stage of the reply and rejoinder process either party may
propose a friendly settlement. 8 The Commission must aid the parties
in reaching a friendly settlement based upon the respect for human
rights recognized in the Convention. 9 The OAS Secretary General is
responsible for making friendly settlements public.40 If the parties fail
to reach a friendly settlement, the Commission, because it is a quasijudicial body, lacks the authority to issue a binding decision. The Commission does have, however, a range of options available to protect and
promote human rights.
When the Commission determines that sufficient elements for a judgment exist, it may adopt a report that contains facts, conclusions of
law, and recommendations regarding an individual or collective case.41
In its report, the Commission may also make proposals and recommendations.42 Both parties receive a copy of the report with the hope that
the state will implement the recommendations.43 If the state does not
implement the recommendations within the time the Commission sets,
the Commission may publish the report as part of its Annual Report or
in another suitable manner.44 The OAS General Assembly addresses
these reports and may include its own recommendations. At any time
during this procedure, the Commission may send contentious cases to
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights for a binding judgment.40
In addition to processing cases, the Commission serves as the OAS
authority on human rights.48 Xenia Wilkinson 7 said the Commission
has earned a reputation for making fair and authoritative assessments
of human rights violations. In one instance, the Commission offered
38. IACHR Regs., supra note 7, art. 45, para. 1.
39. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 48, para. 1 (f); see also infra notes
131-33 and accompanying text (listing the claims of the Honduran government in cases
submitted to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights regarding the Commission
after failure to reach a friendly settlement).
40. IACHR Regs., supra note 7, art. 45, para. 6.
41. Id. art. 46. If the parties cannot reach a friendly settlement the Commission
prepares a report. Id. art. 46, para. 2. The Commis~ion then processes the report as a
case. Id. arts. 47-48. Professor Shelton recognized that some ambiguity exists concerning whether Commission members must be present during a discussion to vote or
whether they may vote by proxy. Professor Shelton called upon the Commission to
clarify its voting procedure on reports and resolutions.
42. Id. art. 47, para. 1.
43. Id. art. 47, para. 3.
44. Id. art. 48, para. 2.
45. Id. art. 50, para. 1.
46. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 41; IACHR Regs., supra note 7, art.
1, para. 1; New IACHR Statute, supra note 6, art. 18.
47. Ms. Wilkinson is the Alternate Representative of the United States to the
OAS.
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proof of such extreme violations that the report, in effect, "delegitimated" the authority of a government.48
Finally, the Commission engages in promotional efforts to increase
awareness of human rights issues. 4 9 It sponsors conferences and publishes a wide variety of booklets and instructional texts. Panel members
called upon the Commission to expand its efforts to include more selfpromotion.50 They recommended holding press conferences after its sessions and after taking interim measures to focus attention on the
Commission.
Mr. Padilla observed that many improvements of the Inter-American
system require an increased budget. The current budget allows for a
staff of seven lawyers; an increase in budget and staff would accelerate
the petition process. Although the Commission has maintained a prolonged presence in certain troubled areas,"1 having a permanent representative in each state would greatly improve conditions. A permanent
representative could receive petitions, protect individuals, and promote
the policies of the Commission in that state. Accordingly, all of the
participants called upon the OAS General Assembly to allocate more
funds to the budget of the Commission.
B.

THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The panel next turned to the other half of the Inter-American
human rights system: the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The
American Convention on Human Rights established the Court in 1979
48. See Res. I, OASOR Ministers of Foreign Affairs (17th mtg.) 1-2, OEA/ser.
F./II.17, doc. 19/78 rev. 2 (1978); Res. 11, OASOR Ministers of Foreign Affairs (17th

mtg.) 1-2, OEA/ser. F./II.17, doe. 40/79 rev. 2 (1979), reprinted in I HUMAN
RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note 10, Booklet No. 6, at 181-83 (call-

ing for the immediate and definitive replacement of the Somoza regime; installation of

a democratic government with principal representative groups that opposed the Somoza
regime; respect for human rights of all Nicaraguans; and the holding of free elections).
The Commission drafted a detailed report that provided the OAS with the moral and
legal justification for the unprecedented action of asking a national leader to step down.
See INTER-AM. C.H.R., REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN TilE RE-

PUBLIC OF NICARAGUA 1, OEA/ser. L./V/11.45, doe. 16 rev. I (1978), excerpted in 4
HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note 10, Booklet No. 22, at 6672 (reporting the findings of the Commission regarding human rights violations the
Nicaraguan government committed).

49. See IACHR Regs., supra note 7, art. 45 (allowing the Commission to publish
its reports in the annual report to the OAS or in any other way the Commission considers suitable).
50. Professor Shelton suggested that the Commission allow its staff members to
serve as expert witnesses in domestic cases where human rights are at issue.
51. Mr. Padilla cited the prolonged presence of the Commission in the Dominican
Republic after the 1965 invasion of the United States Marines, and on the El SalvadorHonduras border during the so-called "soccer wars."
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to elevate human rights to the rule of law.52 The Court sits in San Jose,
Costa Rica, under an agreement between the Court and the govern-

ment of Costa Rica. The Court consists of seven members elected individually for seven-year terms. 3 It has jurisdiction over the nineteen
OAS states that are parties to the Convention." The Court in its adjudicatory capacity may issue legally binding judgments,5 5 but only after
a state consents to the binding jurisdiction of the Court.56 Ratifying
states may either accept the jurisdiction of the Court in all cases or
reserve the right to accept jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis. 7 To
date, nine states have accepted compulsory jurisdiction.5 8 The panel
urged the OAS General Assembly to encourage more states to accept
compulsory jurisdiction.
Only the Commission and states that are parties to the Convention
may file contentious cases with the Court. 59 Individuals may not file
petitions. When the Commission files a case and the state involved has
not accepted compulsory jurisdiction, the Commission must request the
52. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 81. The Convention established the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights as an autonomous judicial institution whose
purpose is the application and interpretation of the American Convention on Human
Rights. Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, art. 1, G.A. Res. 448,
OAS (9th Sess.), OEA/ser. G./CP doc. 1113/80 (1980) [hereinafter Court Statute].
The Commission adopted rules of procedure in 1980. Rules of Procedure of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, INTER-AM. COURT H.R., OEA/ser. L./V/]II.3,
doc. 13 corr. 1 (Apr. 15, 1981) [hereinafter Court Rules].
53. Court Statute, supra note 52, art. 4, para. 1. The Court Statute, article 4,
paragraph I controls the composition of the Court. Id. No two judges may be nationals
of the same state. Id. art. 4, para. 2. Judges may be from any OAS state but only
states party to the American Convention on Human Rights may noninate them.
American Convention, supra note 6, art. 53.
54. The American Convention on Human Rights: Signatures, Ratifications, Texts
of the Instruments of Ratification and Accession, reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note
5, at 70-101. Parties to the American Convention on Human Rights are: Argentina,
Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru,
Uruguay, and Venezuela. Id. Non-ratifying OAS states are Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Dominica, Paraguay, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Saint
Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and the
United States. Id.
55. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 67.
56. Id. art. 62, para. 1.
57. Id. art. 62, para. 2.
58. See id. art. 62 (defining the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court). Argentina,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela
have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. INTER-AM. C.H.R. 6 n.l,
OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987).
59. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 61, para. 1. Contentious cases must
come before the Court after parties exhaust the procedures of the Commission under
articles 48 and 50. Id. art. 61, para. 2.
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consent of that state to jurisdiction.6 0 If the Court decides against a
government in a contentious case, it may require the state to (1) restore
the victim's rights; (2) remedy the general situation; or (3) pay fair
compensation. 61 At any time in the proceedings or at the request of the
Commission, the Court has the authority to take provisional measures
if a person's life or physical integrity are in danger.0 2
In addition to its adjudicatory capacity, the Court may issue advisory
opinions."3 Any member state or organ of the OAS may request the
Court to issue an opinion on a hypothetical question of law with regard
to the interpretation of instruments concerning the protection of human
rights in the American states." Consequently, advisory opinions typically involve interpreting the OAS Charter, the American Declaration
of Rights and Duties of Man, or the American Convention on Human
Rights. 65 The Court, however, is not limited to rendering interpretations of these instruments.66 The Court held, in a 1982 advisory opinion, that its advisory powers extend to other international human rights
instruments if they directly relate to the protection of human rights in
an OAS member state.67 Finally, states may also seek advisory opinions
to test the compatibility of their domestic law with the OAS Charter,
American Declaration, and American Convention. 8
60. IACHR Regs., supra note 7, art. 50, para. 3. See infra notes 130-37 and accompanying text (listing the first three contentious cases before the Court).
61. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 63, para. 1.
62. Id. art. 63, para. 2.
63. Id. art. 64.
64. Id. art. 64, para. 1.
65. Id. Article 64, paragraph 1 states: "The member states of the Organization
may consult the Court regarding the interpretation of this Convention or of other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the American states." Id.
66. See LEGAL AND POLICY IssuEs, supra note 15, at 468-69 (discussing the ambiguity regarding the scope of and possible broader interpretations of article 64).
67. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., "Other Treaties" Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction
of the Court (art. 64, American Convention on Human Rights) (Advisory Opinion OC1/82 of Sept. 24, 1982), reprinted in 4 HUMAN RIGHTs: THE INTER-AbIERICAN SYSTEM, supra note 10, Booklet No. 25, at 69. The Court held that it had advisory jurisdiction with respect to treaties to which American states were parties. Id. para. 52. The
scope of the advisory jurisdiction of the Court is not limited to treaties adopted within
the Inter-American system. Id. para 20. The Court cannot exercise advisory jurisdiction over non-member states, but it may interpret any treaty that affects human rights
in a member state. Id. para. 21. Such an extension of jurisdiction is intended to assist
the OAS states in fulfilling their international human rights obligations and to assist
the organs of the Inter-American system in fulfilling their functions. Id. para. 25.
68. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 64(2). The rules of the Court state the
procedure for requesting an interpretation relating to domestic laws. Court Rules,
supra note 52, art. 51. See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Political Constitution of Costa Rica (Advisory Opinion 4 OC4/84 of Jan. 19, 1984), reprinted in 4 HUMAN RIGHTs: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYsEMt,
supra note 10, Booklet No. 25.1, at 38 (noting that Costa Rica employed this option to
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Advisory opinions do not bind the requesting state. Governments and
the Commission, however, find advisory opinions useful in a number of
ways. The opinions serve as a guide for future government action, 9
defuse tension in situations of political impasse,70 carry considerable
moral force, and focus international attention on human rights violations. 7 1 The panel strongly suggested increased study of advisory opinion jurisprudence and its impact on the administrative and legislative
process.
II.

THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN
HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM: PRESENT DYNAMICS AND
FUTURE OPTIONS

The second panel of the conference focused its discussion on the political realities within the inter-American human rights system. Edith
Marquez 2 and Xenia Wilkinson, OAS representatives from Venezuela
and the United States joined Mark Schneider,7 3 Sonia Picado7 4, and
Tom Farer75 , members of nongovernmental organizations and the acatest a proposed revision of its naturalization laws). In determining whether to exercise
advisory jurisdiction, the Court will decide whether an advisory opinion would assist
the requesting state to comply with its international human rights obligations. Id. para.
30.
69. See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Political Constitution of Costa Rica, (Advisory Opinion 4 OC-4/84 of Jan.

19, 1984), para. 26, reprinted in 4

HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM,

supra note 10, Booklet No. 25.1, at 38. (noting that advisory opinions advance the
protection of basic human rights and freedoms). A state can prevent violations through
seeking and heeding the advice of the Court before enacting formal legislation. Id.
70. See id. para. 30 (warning that the Court will exercise great care when granting
requests for advisory opinions to ensure that it will not affect the outcome of the domestic legislative process).
71. Mr. Moyer cited the third opinion of the Court to demonstrate the moral force
and consciousness-raising powers of advisory opinions. See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4), American Convention on Human
Rights) (Advisory Opinion OC-3/83 of Sept. 8, 1983), reprinted in 4 HUMAN RIGHTS:
THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM,

supra note 10, Booklet No. 25.1, at 3 (noting that

Guatemala extended the death penalty to cover crimes that were not included at the
time of its ratification). The Commission requested an advisory opinion on whether a
state could legally adopt the Guatemalan measures. Id. para. 8. The Court held that
under the American Convention such measures were clearly illegal. Id. para.
76(3)(a)(1). The Court, however, left open the possibility that it might reject an advisory opinion request instituted to disguise a contentious case. Id. para. 28. Mr. Moyer
stated that, in response to international pressure, Guatemala quickly announced the
suspension of the measures.
72. Ms. Marquez is an Ambassador, Mission of Venezuela to the OAS.
73. Mr. Schneider is a Board Member of the International Human Rights Law
Group.
74. Ms. Picado is the Executive Director of the Inter-American Institute for
Human Rights, Costa Rica.
75. Mr. Farer is a Professor of Law at the Washington College of Law, The Amer-
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demic community in addressing current political issues in the hemisphere. Two conditions must exist for the complete development of civil
77
and political rights."6 First, strong democratic institutions must exist.
Second, economic, social, and cultural rights must be realized. 8 Mr.
Schneider stated that the slow development of these rights is attributed
to stagnant political thought. Consequently, political behavior must
change before a solution becomes possible. He added that American
democracies must, therefore, mobilize public opinion to foster fundamental changes in the political will.
A. POLITICAL ISSUES
In the first panel, Ms. Young noted the trend of progressively weaker
OAS General Assembly resolutions and pointed to the current lack of
political resolve of the Organization. The General Assembly, composed
of representatives of member states, bears the ultimate responsibility
for the preservation of peace and human rights.7 9 Accordingly, its resolutions concerning human rights violations reflect its commitment to
human rights.
Since 1980, the public has perceived that the General Assembly has
not completely fulfilled its responsibilities in even the most egregious
cases.8 0 Ms. Young compared the resolutions of the seventies and those
ican University, and past President of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights.
76. See American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, adopted May 2,
1948, by the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota, Colombia,
reprintedin HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 19 [hereinafter Declaration] (noting the importance of civil and political rights). Chapter I of the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man guarantees civil and political rights, while chapter II addresses the civil and political duties of citizens. Id. arts. I-XXXVIII.
77. See infra notes 87-88, 102-03, 105-10 and accompanying text (discussing the
condition of the democratic institutions in Latin America). The OAS states adopted
instruments guaranteeing civil and political rights. See supra note 76 (listing the instruments in the Inter-American system guaranteeing civil and political rights). The
failure of these rights to take root in Latin America is blamed in part on the weak
democratic institutions found in the region. See infra note 102-03 (noting the weakness
of democratic institutions in many OAS states).
78. See Declaration, supra note 76, arts. 1-28 (enumerating specific economic, social, and cultural rights).
79. OAS Charter, supra note 5, art. 52. In most cases, resolutions require an absolute majority vote. Id. art. 57. Observers regard the General Assembly resolutions as
an indicator of the level of human rights commitment among the OAS states. I
HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note 10, Booklet No. 7, at iv.
80. Ms. Young recalled that General Assembly resolutions before 1975 were often
weakly worded and limited to thanking the Commission for its work. Since the Commission made its first special report on the status of human rights in Chile in 1974, the
resolutions have named specific states. See OAS GA Res. 192 (V-O/75) (noting that
this was the first time the Commission reports were not merely noted and filed). Begin-
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of the eighties to illustrate this trend. The resolutions of the later seventies condemned states by name for violating human rights.8" This
strong political consensus culminated in the unprecedented 1979 resolution calling for the abdication of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua. 8
The transition of the role of the General Assembly occurred one year
later when the General Assembly adopted a resolution directly in response to the disappearances in Argentina. The resolution, however,

failed to name any state as responsible.8 3 The adoption of only a single
resolution in 1986 further exemplifies the weakened role of the General
Assembly.84 This resolution simply called on nations named in the Annual Report to remain faithful to their human rights obligations.80
This evidence of a trend toward weaker resolutions presented in the
first discussion evoked varied responses from the second panel. Ms. Picado suggested that fear on the part of various states of being targeted
in the next resolution often caused a "conspiracy of silence." 8 In fact,
ning in 1980, however, the General Assembly adopted omnibus resolutions and responded to all of the work of the Commission. I HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note 10, Booklet No. 7, at iv. As a result, omnibus resolutions
became the preferred method of dealing with human rights issues. Id. Judge Buergenthal warned that the omnibus resolutions were a significant setback for OAS
human rights efforts. LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note 15, at 484 n.156. Judge
Buergenthal further speculated that the development might signal a trend toward
weaker support for human rights. Id.
81. Ms. Young read as an example a resolution of the OAS General Assembly
referring to the REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ON
THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN PARAGUAY,

reprinted in 1 HUMAN

RIGHTS: THE

supra note 10, Booklet No. 7, at 62. In that report, the
Commission concluded that "in Paraguay the great majority of the human rights recognized in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and in other
instruments are not respected in a manner in keeping with the international commitments assumed by that country." Id.
82. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing the investigation of the
Commission into the human rights violations of the Somoza regime).
83. See AG/Res. 510 (X-0/80), INTER-AM. C.H.R. 79, OEA/ser. P./AG doc.
1350/80 rev. 19 (1980), reprinted in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note 10, Booklet No. 7, at 84 (noting that the resolution merely mentions
situations in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Haiti, Paraguay and Uruguay). The resolution directs much attention to the disappearances in Argentina. Id. at 85. The General
Assembly resolved:
To urge the governments of the member states that have not yet done so to adopt
and put into practice the necessary measures to preserve and safeguard the full
exercise of human rights, especially in those cases
that concern the status of individuals detained without due process, the disappearance of persons, the return of exiles and the lifting of states of emergency.
Id.
84. AG/Res. 778 (XV-0/85), INTER-AM. C.H.R. 38-39, OEA/ser. P./AG doc.
2023/85 rev. 12 (1986), reprinted in I HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note 10, Booklet 7.1, at 24.
85. Id.
86. Judge Buergenthal has also spoken of a tacit agreement among the OAS states
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM,
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this "conspiracy" did not seem to protect smaller nations, like Suriname, from being named in subsequent resolutions. Later in the conference, Dr. Joo Baena Soares, Secretary General of the OAS, gave the
opinion that changes in wording had not affected the "essence" of the
work of the Commission or the "substance" of its resolutions. Professor
Farer suggested that the trend toward weakness resulted from the fact
that while the power of so-called "middle states" has increased, the
United States still remains central to the effective implementation of
human rights. Thus the significance of the radical change between
1979 and 1981 clearly reflected the change in administrations in Washington, D.C."7 The OAS General Assembly resolutions before 1980 reflect President Carter's emphasis on human rights in foreign policy,
while the resolutions after 1980 reflected President Reagan's policy of
"quiet" diplomacy.88
The emergence of new democracies in the Western Hemisphere and
their effect on the status of human rights signify a changing environment in the OAS.8" The Commission earned its reputation for the prowith respect to the weak resolutions before the report on Chile in 1974. Buergenthal,
The Inter-AmericanSystem for the Protectionof Human Rights, in LEGAL AND POLicy ISSUES, supra note 15; at 483.
87. See generally Carleton & Stohl, The Foreign Policy of Human Rights: Rhetoric and Reality from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan, 7 Hum. RTs. Q. 205, 205
(1985) [hereinafter Carleton & Stohl] (comparing the human rights policies of the
Carter and Reagan administrations as regards the enunciated principles and rationales
of their policies). Ronald Reagan criticized the foreign policy of the Carter administration for stressing human rights in situations where it caused embarrassment to allies of
the United States and reduced United States influence on those allies. Id. at 225.
Through his foreign policy, President Reagan criticized the human rights records of
totalitarian regimes allied with the Soviet Union while exercising quiet diplomacy with
pro-west authoritarian regimes. Id. at 209; see Kirkpatrick, Dictatorshipsand Double
Standards, COMMENTARY, Nov. 1979, at 35-37 (distinguishing authoritarian from totalitarian regimes on the basis of the disruptive effect of totalitarian regimes on traditional society). Kirkpatrick, who had enormous influence on the foreign policy of the
Reagan administration, prefers the repression of an authoritarian regime to the claim
of a totalitarian regime to jurisdiction over the entire society that disrupts traditional
social institutions. But see Carleton & Stohl, supra, at 220 (criticizing Kirkpatrick for
emphasizing theoretical considerations over political realities). Carleton and Stohl assert that actions of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes are frequently indistinguishable. Id. Furthermore, many totalitarian states allow aspects of the traditional society,
such as religion, black markets, and political dissent, to continue. In contrast to the
Kirkpatrick thesis, authoritarian regimes frequently reach beyond political institutions
to disturb social institutions. Id. at 219-22.
88. See Carleton & Stohl, supra note 87, at 222-23 (comparing the respective emphases of the Carter and Reagan foreign policies). Empirical studies show that the
Carter foreign policy, despite its rhetoric, failed to withdraw United States assistance
from friendly governments that violated human rights. Id. at 214-17. The one exception
to the rule was Latin America, where geopolitical factors reduced the possible political
costs of following through on the rhetoric. Id. at 224.
89. See BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SPECIAL REPORT No.
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tection of human rights through its performance during the period of
1970-1981, the era of the "national security state." 90 A national security state governs through intimidation, including torture, numerous disappearances, and extra-judicial killings.91 It frequently declares a state
of emergency as a device to suspend political rights. 2 The Commission
dealt effectively with these blatant violations of human rights by making public individual cases and by focusing the world's attention on the
general situation.93 The Commission also persuaded governments that
158, DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: THE PROMISE AND THE
CHALLENGE 1 (1987) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA] (recognizing the
new political situation in Latin America brought about by the decade-long trend of
replacing military regimes with democratically elected governments); see infra notes
146-50 (discussing the issues that often arise in the context of the transition to a democratic government). Challenges may arise to the validity of an election on which a
government bases its claim to legitimacy. Similarly, as part of the transition to democracy, a civilian government may enact laws granting amnesty to persons involved in
human rights violations under the authority of the outgoing military regime.
90. See Military Regimes in Latin America, 17 INT'L COMM'N JURISTS REV. 13,
13-16 (1976) [hereinafter Military Regimes in Latin America] (noting the emergence
of a new pattern of oppressive regimes in Latin America in the early seventies). By the
mid-seventies many Latin American states ruled under states of emergency. Id. In
every case the regime originated from a military coup. Id. Rulers declared states of
emergency to give the executive branch extra-constitutional powers. Id. The executive
branch used these powers to quash all forms of political expression which could be seen
as an open door to communism. Id. The ideology of the "national security state" consisted of blind loyalty to the military and the preservation of a form of capitalism,
reminiscent of the nineteenth century, found in the states. Id.
91. Id. at 20-22. National security forces typically aim repressive tactics first at
members of armed movements, then at left-wing groups, and finally at all forms of
political opposition. Id. In the first stages the military carries out the oppressive measures. Later, the police and special security forces under military control take over. Id.
The breakdown of the rule of law in the national security state may even lead to unofficial oppression by paramilitary and parapolice groups that have apparent strong links
with the official security authorities. Id.
92. Id. at 14. Most national security states adopt emergency measures to concentrate power in the executive. Id. Under the guise of constitutionally-implemented states
of emergency, the executive places limitations on human rights. Id. at 14-15. The Executive then takes measures to. suspend civil, political, economic, social, and cultural
rights. Id. With the political system for protecting fundamental rights destroyed, the
repressive measures of the state become increasingly violent. Id.; see Grossman, A
Frameworkfor the Examination of States of Emergency Under the American Convention on Human Rights, 1 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 35, 37 (1986) (concluding that
studies indicate that the greater the magnitude of human rights violations, the less
likely those ruling under the state of emergency will restore human rights protections).
93. See American Convention, supra note 6, art. 27 (regulating the suspension of
human rights guarantees during states of emergency). Article 27, paragraph 1
provides:
In time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence or security of a State Party, it may take measures derogating from its
obligations under the present Convention to the extent and for the period of time
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures
are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law and do not
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legitimate states of emergency can be enforced without violating fundamental human rights.9 4

Fortunately, during the present decade, the number of OAS member
states with democratically-elected governments has increased. Commensurate with this trend, egregious human rights violations have decreased. 5 Democratic governments typically recognize fundamental
human rights in their constitutions and, at least in theory, represent the
will of their citizens.9 In the 1990s the Inter-American human rights
system will confront the more subtle problems associated with political
participation and the realization of economic, social, and cultural
rights. 97 The panel emphasized the promotion and maintenance of deminvolve discrimination on the ground of race, color, sex, language, religion, or
social origin.
Id. The Commission has publicized state failures to meet the criteria contained in article 27 for declaring a state of emergency or suspending rights. Grossman, supra note
92, at 37 n.7.
94. See American Convention, supra note 6, art. 27, para. 2 (making certain rights
absolute and nonderogable under the Convention). Article 27, paragraph 2 states:
The foregoing provision does not authorize any suspension of the following articles: Article 3 (Right to Juridical Personality), Article 4 (Right to Life), Article
5 (Right to Humane Treatment), Article 6 (Freedom from Slavery), Article 9
(Freedom from Ex post facto Laws), Article 12 (Freedom of Conscience and
Religion), Article 17 (Rights of the Family), Article 18 (Right to a Name),
Article 19 (Right of the Child), Article 20 (Right to Nationality), and Article 23
(Right to Participate in Government), or of the judicial guarantees essential for
the protection of such rights.
Id. A government may not suspend these rights even during a valid state of emergency.
Id. The Convention allows a government to suspend derogable rights in an effort to
cope with a national emergency, provided that the government meets certain requirements: (1) necessity; (2) temporary status; (3) proportionality; (4) non-discrimination;
(5) compatibility with other international obligations; and (6) adherence to domestic
law. Grossman, supra note 92, at 50-53.
Most officials completely agree with the Commission's statement of law but each
believes their case the exception. Farer, Human Rights and Human Wrongs: Is the
Liberal Model Sufficient?, 7 Hum. Rrs. Q. 189, 194 (1985) (relating the experiences
of the author with Argentine officials).
95. 95. INTER-AM. C.H.R. 20, OEA/ser. L./V/Il.50, doe. 13 rev. 1 (1980) [herein-

after IACHR 1979-1980

ANNUAL REPORT].

But see id. (noting no appreciable im-

provement in human rights conditions since the previous Annual Report). The Commission established that neglect of economic and social rights and suppression of
political participation leads to the violation of the right to physical safety. Id. at 151. In
other words, neglect of economic and social rights, especially when the government
suppresses political participation, produces the kind of social polarization that leads to
acts of terrorism by and against the government. Id.
96. See Mller, Fundamental Rights in Democracy, 4 Humi. R-rs. L.J. 131, 134
(1983) (discussing that although pure democracy represents absolute majority will, it
does not necessarily guarantee a good human rights record). Constitutional democracies with certain rules of procedure that place fundamental individual rights beyond the
majority will hold a promise for a good human rights record. Id. The panel deemed
these rights essential for an environment conducive to a good human rights record.
97. See Park, Human Rights and Modernization: A Dialectical Relationship?, 2

AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

[VOL. 3:517

ocratic institutions as a primary means to achieve an ideal political
environmentY8
Professor Farer explained that when civilians win a national election
and replace a military regime, the newly-elected government often
faces serious problems. Having allowed the election, the military then
inhibits the new leaders from implementing social and economic reforms essential for the success of the new government. In most cases
the military remains untouched by the civilian authority. In Brazil, for
example, the military effectively vetoed a constitutional proposal to
divest it of jurisdiction over crimes committed by security services. In
some states the military continued to administer rural areas without
civilian oversight. In Guatemala and El Salvador, where the military
shares power with the civilian government, a question arises of whether
the states can call themselves "real democracies." Professor Farer
stressed that the distinction between facade and real democracies must
be preserved. All too frequently, states hide authoritarian practices behind the label of "democracy."
The coup d'6tat, the military's ultimate "veto" of civilian government, effectively denies the popular exercise of political will. Professor
Farer suggested consideration of a league of democratic Caribbean basin states obligated to support civilian governments against coups d'6tat
by their militaries. Under the plan, a Caribbean league would come to
the aid of a threatened civilian government at the request of the highest government official alive and free in the wake of a coup. Unless
such a league could enlist the support of important Western democracies such as Canada, the United Kingdom, and Spain, in addition to
the United States, however, it would tend to be, and to be seen as, a
nineteenth century protectorate in twentieth-century drag.9 9 A league
UNIVERSAL

HUM. RTs. 85 (1980) (discussing an empirical study that showed a positive

relationship between nations achieving economic, political, and civil rights for their citizens and a good human rights record).

98. See INTER-AM. C.H.R. 19, OEA/ser. P./AG doc. 2166/87 (1987) [hereinafter IACHR 1986-1987 ANNUAL REPORT] (stating that the Commission declares democracy the best guarantee for the observance of human rights). The Commission considered a democratic framework essential for the establishment of a political society
where human values can be fully realized. Id. at 151.
99. Professor Farer said the United States would act pursuant to its obligations
under the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty and in accordance with customary international law. But see Farer, Limiting Intraregional Violence: The Costs of Regional
Peacekeeping, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 195, 198-201 (T.
Farer ed. 1979) [hereinafter Farer]
cies). Professor Farer asserts that
neutrality because their interests in
at 200. The United States may be
regional peacekeeper. Id.

(discussing the neutrality of other major democrathe major democracies in the region tend toward
Latin America are almost exclusively economic. Id.
the only major democracy able to play the role of
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including a number of wealthy states could provide financial reinforcement for democratic regimes. Although Professor Farer expressed serious doubts about the feasibility of such a plan, precedent does exist for
assistance to elected officials faced with military rebellions. Civilian
governments in Africa have successfully called upon their former colonial rulers to intervene on their behalf. 100 Professor Farer added that
such a league would tend to discipline United States tendencies to intervene in the Caribbean basin, which are likely to endure. How it
might deal with attempts to displace non-elected governments is an
even more difficult question.
B. AN INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE
Through the various OAS instruments, states have pledged to promote political, economic, social, and cultural rights within a democratic
context.10 1 Latin American constitutions, however, frequently make eloquent pronouncements of political rights that, in fact, fail to come to

fruition.10 2 Given a climate of chronic economic crisis and military
dominance, Latin America has generally failed to support democratic
institutions.103 In response to these concerns, the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights and the government of Costa Rica established the
autonomous Inter-American Institute of Human Rights (the Institute). °4 The Institute fosters human rights and democratic values in

society through a variety of activities.100
The achievement of human rights also depends on strengthening the
100. Professor Farer also gave the example that, in 1964, Kenya and Tanzania
asked for British intervention to suppress their coups d'6tat. The new nations quickly
received military assistance, after which the British withdrew.
101. OAS Charter, supra note 5, art. 31; American Convention, supra note 6, art.
26; Declaration, supra note 76, arts. XI-XIV, XVI.
102. See Burns, The Continuity of the National Period, in LATIN AmERICA, ITS
PROBLEMS AND IS PROMISE 61, 72-74 (J. Black ed. 1984) [hereinafter Black] (discussing the backlash against democratic reform).
103. Black, Participation and Political Process: The Collapsing Pyramid, in Black,
supra note 102, at 165, 187-89. In Latin America, economic crises, caused by fluctuations in world commodity markets as well as uneven distribution of wealth, lead to the
questioning of the existing political structure. Id. at 173. Such questioning threatens
the interests of the elite, traditionally the landowners. Id. The elite then turn to the
military to protect the status quo. Id.
104. See Ventura, Costa Rica and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 4
HuM. RT. L.J. 273, 281 (1983) (discussing the Agreement between Costa Rica and
the IACHR, signed July 30, 1980, which the Legislative Assembly of Costa Rica later
ratified by Law No. 6482 of October 28, 1980).
105. Id. Sonia Picado stressed the problems associated with building a democratic
tradition in Latin America. Ms. Picado noted that the Institute takes a multidisciplinary approach to its mission; this approach integrates human rights principles in all
areas of study instead of presenting a single human rights class.
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role of the judiciary. In many OAS states, the judiciary has little independent power. 106 Typically, a close relationship exists between the judiciary and the executive branches of government. 10 7 The executive can
therefore manipulate the courts through threats and bribes.10 8 In addition, the executive can institute permanent restrictions on the judiciary's defense of human rights by declaring a state of siege. The Institute lobbies for judicial reform in Latin America by calling for stronger
courts to protect human rights and to promote respect for the rule of
law. It also encourages stricter separation of constitutional and budgetary matters and promotes the prestige of the judiciary through such
devices as holding annual meetings of the justices of OAS states.
The Institute also hopes to promote a democratic spirit among the
people of Latin America, to instill democratic values in what traditionally have been authoritarian societies. In many states, from grade
school to university, the textbooks have an authoritarian bias. In response, the Institute has produced textbooks incorporating a democratic
bias; these books are now in use in Brazil. In Uruguay, the government
has used the Institute's assistance in integrating democratic values into
the entire school curriculum. While not an activist organization itself,
the Institute has focused on the training of human rights activists in
the use of the Inter-American system and of domestic processes. Many
states have welcomed these trained people as an alternative to the leaders of leftist movements.
C.

PERSPECTIVES OF

Two OAS STATES

The OAS representatives from Venezuela and the United States provided the panel with their perspectives on the Inter-American human
rights system. Edith Marquez, the representative from Venezuela, explained why the international defense of human rights forms an essential part of her nation's foreign policy. First, in its almost 30 years of
106. See Garro, The Role of the Argentine Judiciary in Controlling Governmental
Action Under a State Of Siege, 4 HUM. RTs. L.J. 311, 314 (1983) (discussing repeated
purges of members of the Supreme Court and of the highest provincial courts of the
previous government in Argentina). Although the Argentine Constitution of 1853
names the judicial branch as one of the co-equal branches of government, the lack of

sustained constitutional governments in Argentina has made it impossible for the Supreme Court of Argentina to exercise independence. Id.
107. Id. For example, in Argentina, each new government typically purges the
courts when it comes to power. Id. Military juntas likewise remove and appoint new
members to the Supreme Court. Id. at 315.
108. See id. at 316 (listing the large numbers of judges that the Argentine government murdered, detained, or who disappeared through early 1978). Argentine judges

who were too lenient on terrorism or too rigorous in investigating abuses of civil rights
received murder threats. Id.
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uninterrupted democracy, Venezuela has made the promotion of
human rights a part of the process of consolidating its democracy. Venezuela has found respect for human rights inseparable from democracy.
The country's experience under the dictatorship of General Marcos Perez Jimenez, in the late 1950s, caused all Venezuelan political parties,
regardless of ideology, to respect human rights. 109 Second, Venezuela
believes that in an increasingly interdependent world, the violation of
human rights has become an issue of international peace."' Third,
Venezuela takes pride in its record of leadership in the hemisphere in
the field of human rights. As one of the original OAS members, Venezuela participated in drafting the instruments, provided leadership in
the Commission, and cooperated with the work of the Commission.
Currently, Venezuela supports the additional protocol to the American
Convention to abolish the death penalty and a special convention to
prevent and punish disappearances.
Xenia Wilkinson, the representative from the United States, praised
the Commission and the Court for their balanced and impartial assessment of human rights violations and pledged support for increased
OAS allocations for the Inter-American human rights system. She explained the role of human rights in the United States foreign policy,
reiterating that the Reagan administration accords human rights the
highest priority. The United States, however, is not a party to the
American Convention on Human Rights. Although President Carter
signed the Convention in 1978, the Senate has not given its advise and
consent to the ratification process.11 The Carter administration endorsed most of the Convention, recommending ratification with certain
12
reservations.1
109. Marty, Venezuela, Colombia. and Ecuador, in Black, supra note 102, at 381,
392. Parties of all ideological positions participate vigorously in the Venezuelan political scheme. Id.
110. See Tugwell, Venezuela and the Inter-American System, in Farer, supra note
99, at 256, 263 (noting that Venezuela subscribes to the Betancourt Doctrine. That
doctrine obliges democratic governments to refuse recognition to military juntas that
overthrow freely elected governments).
S11. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (explaining the Presidential power to make
treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate). Id.
112. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING FOUR
TREATIES PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS, S. EXEC. Doc. F, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1

(1978). In transmitting the Convention to the Senate, President Carter proposed the
adoption of the Convention with a specific declaration, namely that "the United States
declares that the provisions of Articles I through 32 of this Convention are not selfexecuting." Id. The United States declaration reserves the right to choose which rights
will be implemented domestically. Id.; see American Convention, supra note 6, arts. 332 (containing the human rights law of the Convention). These articles constitute the
substantive human rights law of the Convention. Article 2 requires the states parties to

AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

[VOL. 3:517

Two problems for the United States arise in article 4, which pertains
to the right to life. Article 4(1) guarantees a right to life from the
moment of conception. 113 The Supreme Court, in Roe v. Wade, ruled
that a woman's right to choose an abortion in the first trimester of
pregnancy is a constitutionally protected right of privacy."" Article
4(3) prohibits nations that have abolished the death penalty from reestablishing it. 1 5 Under the federal system of the United States, the
states retain exclusive control over the election of the death penalty."'
If the President ratified the American Convention on Human Rights
without a reservation as to article 4, the Senate would thus violate the
Constitution because treaties cannot authorize powers that the Constitution forbids."' Treaties may, however, limit powers reserved to the
states under the tenth amendment." s
Professor Farer suggested the use of reservations to a treaty only as a
last resort. If the laws of a nation conflict with the international standards embodied in the treaty, the government ought to reconsider its
domestic position. In order to sign the Convention without reservations,
the United States would need to impose on the states a degree of uniformity politically impossible. Finally, Ms. Wilkinson expressed concern about the recent trend in applying standards of the Convention to
non-parties. The United States will continue to reject this practice.
As a conclusion to the panel's discussion, Mr. Schneider summarized
the task before the OAS states. The states must transform the standards of the various instruments to a hemispheric tradition of human
rights and an effective enforcement system so that some day no violations will occur. The solution to this great task lies in the mobilization
of the collective political will of the American democracies. When such
a coalition holds human rights above parochial interests and does not
adopt legislation where needed to ensure the rights in articles 3 through 32. Id. art. 2;
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 128 comment g (1965) (discussing the effect of reservations on international
agreements negotiated under the general auspices of the OAS).
113. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 4, para. i.
114. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
115. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 4, para. 3.
116. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding statute allowing for
the discretionary imposition of the death penalty in state that used objective standards
and rules to limit the discretion); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (same); Proffitt
v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (same).
117. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. i, 30 (1957) (holding that United States Military courts exercise exclusive jurisdiction over their forces but that civilian defendants
enjoy the constitutionally-guaranteed right to a trial by jury).
118. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432-33 (1920) (holding that matters
such as the regulation of migratory birds are powers not delegated to the states and
thus proper areas for Congress to preempt by international treaty).
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hesitate to act in their defense, the Inter-American system will enter a
new era.
III. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE COURT AND THE
COMMISSION IN ADDRESSING DISAPPEARANCES,
SUMMARY EXECUTION, AND THE TREATMENT OF
PRISONERS
The third panel discussed the procedures and limitations of the InterAmerican human rights system when confronted with "incommunicado
violations" of human rights. The panel included Edmundo Vargas Carrefto, Executive Secretary of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, and Professors Robert Dinerstein, Claudio Grossman,
and Dinah Shelton, members of the academic community. 10 Disappearances, summary executions, mistreatment of prisoners, and situations where the government has the victim in detention out of the public eye are classified as incommunicado violations. Of the petitions the
Commission handled during the "national security" era, petitions for
incommunicado violations occurred most frequently; in Central
America, allegations of incommunicado violations still make up the
majority of petitions. 2
Mr. Carrefto explained the special problems of dealing with incommunicado detentions. The framers of the American Convention on
Human Rights incorporated many procedures and norms from the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 21
Because the European model presupposes the existence of a strong
democratic tradition, procedures adopted from the European model
have not worked well in the Americas,122 especially in relation to
human rights violations. For example, the American Convention on
119.

Mr. Dinerstein is an Associate Professor and Deputy Director of Clinical Pro-

grams at The American University, Washington College of Law; Mr. Grossman is a
Professor of Law and Director of the International Legal Studies Program at The
American University, Washington College of Law.
120. See Military Regimes in Latin America, supra note 90, at 13-16 (noting the

emergence in the early seventies of oppressive regimes in Latin America); IACHR
1979-80 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 95, at 151 (noting the tremendous wave of murder, torture and arbitrary detention in the western hemisphere); INTER-A,. C.H.R.
111, OEA/ser. L./V/11.54, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1981) (characterizing summary executions,

disappearances and torture as among the principal manifestations of human rights violations during the period covered by the report).
121. LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES, supra note 15, at 441.
122. See Buergenthal, The American and European Conventions on Human
Rights: Similaritiesand Differences, 30 Aht. U.L. REv. 155, 156 (1980) (noting that
the existence of non-democratic regimes and large-scale poverty make the enforcement

of human rights in the region more difficult than in Western Europe).
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Human Rights obliges the Commission to pursue a friendly settlement
as a first step in processing individual petitions.12 3 In cases of disappearances, however, the government usually denies that the situation
exists and the attempt at a friendly settlement becomes an empty gesture. Fulfilling the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies 12 may
present a similar situation. Budget and staff constraints could pose additional procedural problems for the Commission.
Mr. Carreflo went on to say that, despite difficulties, the Commission
gives petitions concerning disappearances immediate attention because
egregious violations of life and physical integrity usually occur within
the first seventy-two hours of detention. Upon receiving and processing
a disappearance petition, 23 the Commission immediately contacts the
appropriate government authority. Sometimes this first action by the
Commission leads to the release of the missing individual, but often
without the government acknowledging the situation. 26 Unfortunately,
for the majority of the petitions, the Commission must open an individual file and begin the slow process of handling a case. The Commission
does not infer guilt but gives the government in question every chance
27
to respond.'
Only if the government fails to respond does the Commission presume the truth of the alleged violations. 2 The government, however,
may have the last word by simply denying all knowledge of the situation. If after exhausting all procedures the Commission finds the government guilty, it may submit a report either to the OAS General As123. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 48, para. 1(f). The American Convention exemplifies this approach, stating that "the Commission shall place itself at the
disposal of the parties concerned with a view to reaching a friendly settlement of the
matter on the basis of respect for the human rights recognized in this Convention." Id.
(emphasis added); see supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (discussing the procedure for a friendly settlement outlined by the regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights); see also infra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing
the discretion of the Commission over the friendly settlement procedure).
124. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (discussing exhaustion of domestic remedies).

125. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (discussing the procedures the
Commission follows once it receives a perfected petition).
126. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text (explaining the relationship between the Commission and governments).

127.

See

HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE,

supra note 12, at 115 (emphasizing the impor-

tance of establishing a nexus between the acts complained of and the involvement of
the government).
128. IACHR Regs., supra note 7, art. 39. The Commission presumes that the complaint transmitted to the government is true if the government fails to provide pertinent

information in a timely manner and if other evidence does not lead to a different conclusion. Id.; see, HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE, supra note 12, at 115-16 (same).
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sembly or to the Court, whichever it considers suitable. 2

The first contentious cases before the Court concerned the disappearance of four persons in Honduras. Professor Claudio Grossman, who
was appointed advisor of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights for the cases, discussed the preliminary rulings of the Court in
these cases. Honduras objected to the court proceedings on several
grounds in a series of preliminary exceptions.1 30 Honduras first asserted
that because the Commission had failed to reach a friendly settlement,
the Court could not claim jurisdiction. 131 The Court ruled that the
Commission has discretion regarding the use of friendly settlements.132
It further ruled that the failure of the government to make any effort
toward a friendly settlement properly placed the cases before the
Court.' 33 In a second objection, Honduras asserted that the procedures
of the Court require on-site visits and preliminary hearings by the
Commission before the Court can hear a case.13 ' The Court ruled that
the Commission also has discretion regarding the use of on-site visits." 5
Honduras further alleged that a failure of the claimants to exhaust domestic remedies barred the Court from having jurisdiction. 36 The
129. The Commission examines evidence such as witnesses and documents that the
government and petitioner provide. IACHR Regs., supra note 7, art. 43.
130. See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., In re Fairen Garbi and Soils Corrales, No. 7951,
para. 16 (Decision of June 26, 1987) (describing how Honduran authorities denied that
two Costa Ricans had crossed into its country); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., In re Godinez
Cruz, No. 7920, paras. 15, 21 (Decision of June 26, 1987) (describing how the Honduras government claimed that a detained man was not in their custody); Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R., In re Velasquez Rodriguez, No. 8097, para. 15 (Decision of June 26, 1987)
(describing how security police denied the detention and torture of a student).
131. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., In re Fairen Garbi and Solis Corrales, No. 7951, para. 37
(Decision of June 26, 1987); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., In re Godinez Cruz, No. 7920, para.
45 (Decision of June 26, 1987); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., In re Velasquez Rodriguez, No.
8097, paras. 42-44 (Decision of June 26, 1987).
132. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., In re Fairen Garbi and Solis Corrales, No. 7951, paras.
49-50 (Decision of June 26, 1987); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., In re Godinez Cruz, No. 7920,
para. 48 (Decision of June 26, 1987); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., In re Velasquez Rodriguez,
No. 8097, para. 45 (Decision of June 26, 1987).
133. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., In re Fairen Garbi and Soils Corrales, No. 7951, para. 51
(Decision of June 26, 1987); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., In re Godinez Cruz, No. 7920, para.
49 (Decision of June 26, 1987); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., In re Velasquez Rodriguez, No.
8097, paras. 45-46 (Decision of June 26, 1987).
134. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., In re Fairen Garbi and Solis Corrales, No. 7951, paras.
52-54 (Decision of June 26, 1987); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., In re Godinez Cruz, No. 7920,
paras. 50, 58 (Decision of June 26, 1987); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., In re Velasquez Rodriguez, No. 8097, paras. 47, 50 (Decision of June 26, 1987).
135. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., In re Fairen Garbi and Solis Corrales, No. 7951, paras.
52-54 (Decision of June 26, 1987); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., In re Godinez Cruz, No. 7920,
paras. 52, 64 (Decision of June 26, 1987); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., In re Velasquez Rodriguez, No. 8097, paras. 48, 52 (Decisior of June 26, 1987).
136. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., In re Fairen Garbi and Solis Corrales, No. 7951, paras.
79-83 (Decision of June 26, 1987); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., In re Godinez Cruz No. 7920,
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Court ruled the objection invalid because the Honduran government
made little effort to establish effective recourse for the protection of the
rights of those under government persecution.' 37 Finally, the Court rejected the objection that each of the proceedings before the Commission violated the procgdure established in the American Convention.
The Court weighed the nature of the alleged violation against the need
for adopting flexible procedures suited for the American system.
Professor Grossman suggested special measures that the Court
should pursue to benefit the victims appearing before it. For example,
the Inter-American system would benefit from following the European
model of allowing independent representation before the Court. 138 Such
a measure would help prevent the concerns of the victim becoming lost
in Court politics. The creation of a fund to assist petitioners with the
costs of using the system would increase accessibility to the Commission and the Court.
The existence of disappearances in a state should prompt the Commission to take immediate urgent steps, such as requesting an on-site
visit, to notify the OAS General Assembly and the Permanent Council
that a serious situation exists. 1 9 The Commission and the OAS General Assembly may adopt a resolution that calls on the concerned government to abide by its international obligations, and to accept the conduct of investigations. 40
The various American human rights instruments fail to use specific
language that addresses forced disappearances.1 4 1 The OAS General
Assembly attempted to remedy this omission in 1983, when it declared
para. 80 (Decision of June 26, 1987); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., In re Velasquez Rodriguez,
No. 8097, paras. 78-80 (Decision of June 26, 1987).
137. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., In re Fairen Garbi and Solis Corrales, No. 7951, paras.
92-94 (Decision of June 26, 1987); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., In re Godinez Cruz, No. 7920,
paras. 94-96 (Decision of June 26, 1987); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., In re Velasquez Rodriguez, No. 8097, paras. 92-93 (Decision of June 26, 1987).

138.

See

HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE,

supra note 12, at 143-44 (explaining the pol-

icy of the European Commission on Human Rights toward legal representation and
legal aid).
139. See IACHR Regs., supra note 7, arts. 58-59 (discussing the need for reports
on human rights); see also INTER-AM. C.H.R., REPORT ON THE STATUS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CHILE: FINDINGS OF "ON-THE-SPOT" OBSERVATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF
CHILE 1, OEA/ser. L./II.34, doc. 21 corr. 1 (1974) (concluding that under the regime

instituted in Chile beginning September 11, 1973, extremely serious violations of
human rights occurred).
140. IACHR Regs., supra note 7, art. 50, para. 1.
141. See American Convention, supra note 6, art. 5 (Right to Humane Treatment), art. 7 (Right to Personal Liberty) (expressly forbidding torture and arbitrary
arrests or imprisonment, and affirming the right to personal liberty, but failing to mention enforced or involuntary disappearances).
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that forced disappearances constitute a crime against humanity. 42 The
General Assembly has played an equally useful role in other areas,
such as the problem of incommunicado detentions. To date, eighteen
states have signed the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, with three states ratifying.1 43 The seventh full session of
the OAS General Assembly will consider the adoption of an InterAmerican convention aimed at preventing and punishing forced disappearances. 1 " Many members of the Assembly hope for a similar convention in the future to deal with summary executions.
In disappearance cases, the Commission has conducted many successful on-site investigations. 4 5 It won a reputation for writing credible
reports and, most importantly, for actually securing the release of disappeared persons. The participants called upon the Commission to
pressure governments to allow on-site visits at the threat of a crisis. If
the Commission appears on the scene early, it can issue advisory opinions and extend its services to abort the crisis.
With the Honduran cases in mind, the panel next discussed the future role of the Court in securing human rights and offered suggestions
to strengthen its impact on OAS states. Professor Grossman explained
that the judicial process is essential to the protection of human rights
because the Court applies standards separate from a political context.
The Court also interprets the human rights instruments and thus develops the law in a neutral context. While those on the extreme right and
extreme left of the political spectrum tend to judge situations on the
basis of political expediency, the participants asserted that the American states were politically mature enough to live by the rule of law.
Many OAS states, however, merely pay lip service to the Court and
public awareness of the Court remains low.
The panel proposed several solutions to these problems. First, the
Commission could present an annual questionnaire to governments.
The questionnaire would ask each government to state what resources
it has alloted to the Court; how the government responded to Commission and OAS resolutions; what the government is doing about the rati142.

AG/Res. 666 (XIII-0/83),

INTER-AM.

C.H.R., OEA/ser. P./AG doe. 1731/

83 rev. 1 (1983). Currently the OAS is receiving comments on a draft convention that
defines torture as an international crime. AG/Res. 624 (XII-0/82), OAS Gen. Assem.,

Proceedings, Certified Texts of the Resolutions at 70 (Washington, D.C.: General Secretariat, 1982).
143. Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, AG/Res. 783
(XV-O/85) 46-54, OEA/ser. P./AG doe. 2023/85 rev. 1 (1986).

144. IACHR 1986-87 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 98, at 277.
145. See ARGENTINA REPORT, supra note 10, at 53-138 (analyzing the issue of
forced disappearances in Argentina).
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fication of various instruments; what the status is of accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court; and what the government is doing for
the Inter-American system in general. The Commission could evaluate
the questionnaires and generate Inter-American competition in defending human rights.
Second, Professor Shelton suggested that holding a press conference
after each Commission and Court meeting, and combining an aggressive press campaign with studies of the Inter-American system, could
increase public awareness. Public awareness is particularly important
in the Inter-American system because the OAS is not a supernational
enforcer. The Court and the Commission depend on public opinion to a
large degree to assure that governments implement various
recommendations.
The panel concluded, calling upon the Court to continue its policy of
refraining from creating rights. Where the human rights instruments
clearly delineate rights the Court must respect the political outcome.
Even in the most compelling cases, the Court risks its credibility when
it creates new rights. The proper course is to strive for additional
protocols.
IV. ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE COURT AND
THE COMMISSION IN CRITICAL ISSUES: POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION, RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS
AND STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACIES
The fourth panel discussed the performance of the Commission and
the Court in terms of addressing critical and controversial issues, and
how this could improve in the future. The panel addressed three critical
issues: (1) free and democratic elections; (2) the rights of indigenous
peoples; and (3) the use of amnesty laws to protect officials who have
committed human rights abuses.
A.

FREE AND DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS

Member states of the OAS have indicated that free and democratic
elections are essential for ensuring human rights. 46 Article XX of the
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man guarantees in
146. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 21, G.A. Res. 217 A (III),
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (stating that widespread political participation shall be the
basis of the authority of government and that participation shall take the form of periodic and genuine elections); OAS Charter, supra note 5, art. 3 (stating that the solidarity of the American states and the goals those states hope to accomplish must be
achieved on the basis of representative democracy).
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general terms the right of every person having legal capacity to partici-

pate in periodic, honest, and free elections. 4 Article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights reaffirms that right. 48 Article 23
indicates the kinds of legal limitations that a state may place on the
participation of people in their government. Under article 23, a state
may restrict participation in elections only on the basis of "age, nation-

ality, education, civil and mental capacity, or sentencing by a competent court in criminal proceedings."1 49 Furthermore, article 27 of the

American Convention specifically excludes participation in government
as a right that a state may suspend during a time of national emer-

gency.150 Failure of a government to protect the right of political participation often has resulted in a domestic challenge to its legitimacy,
with the challenge sometimes taking the form of civil war.

Larry Garber

51

commented on the debate between the OAS Secre-

tariat and the Commission regarding the sending of their representa-

tives as election observers. Since 1962, the OAS has sent observers to
elections in 25 states.152 In 1979, the OAS established a committee to

draft guidelines for OAS election observing, but later tabled the project
because of controversy over the role of such observers.1 3 The OAS
continues to send observers, but their practice of adopting a relatively

low profile raises questions about their efficacy.
The Commission is reluctant to designate election observers in re-

sponse to specific requests from countries because of fear that the very
act of sending observers would serve to legitimate an election. 1

Ob-

147. See Declaration, supra note 76, art. 20 (granting persons with "legal capacity" the right to participate in governing their country).
148. See American Convention, supra note 6, art. 23 (stating that all citizens shall
enjoy the right to participate in government).
149. See id. art. 23(e) (listing the bases upon which governments may regulate
participation in government).
150. See id. art. 27 (enjoining states from denying the right to political participation in national emergencies).
151. Mr. Garber is Legal Director and Director of the Election Observer Project of
the International Human Rights Law Group.
152. Mr. Garber explained that, as of 1984, the OAS had authorized observers for
elections in Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, El
Salvador, and Honduras. U.S. Dep't of State, Research Mem. No. 1304, International
Observation of Elections in Latin America: A Listing 1962-1982, cited in GUIDEUNES
FOR INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVING 8 n.10 (L. Garber ed. 1984) [hereinafter
Garber].
- 153. See OEA/ser. G.ICP./CAJP-417/80 (1980) (noting that the Permanent
Council of the OAS rejected the adoption of the guidelines); see also OEA/ser. G./
CP./CG-1086/80 (1980) (recommending that the OAS Secretary General be authorized to select non-OAS observers at the request of a government).
154. Garber, supra note 152, at 78. "Where the incumbent government seeks observers, and the opposition is not participating, observers function to legitimate a prede-
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servers can reduce this risk of misinterpretation through engaging in
serious and credible fact-finding. Mr. Garber suggested that an OAS
decision not to send observers, for example, on the grounds that the
election in question will not result in a significant transfer of power
from military to civilian authorities, pre-judges an issue that observers
should investigate.
The Commission also addressed the issue of political participation in
its annual and country reports and in its response to some of the cases
and petitions that have been presented to it. For example, in its 1985
country report on Chile, the Commission expounded on the right to
political participation. 155 After determining that Chile's 1980 plebiscite
lacked credibility, 156 the Commission outlined its view on the requirements for genuine elections and representative democracy.'" 7 In its
1986-1987 annual report,' 58 the Commission set forth four basic conditions that must exist for an election or plebiscite to have moral authority: (1) a sufficient number of people must be eligible to vote; (2) voters
must have equitable access to television and radio; (3) the government
must not pressure or intimidate the voters; and (4) the ballots must be
cast and counted so as to assure the accuracy of election results.'0 9
The most recent annual report of the Commission also addressed
specific language in the constitutions of Chile' 10 and of Nicaragua.""
This language proscribes certain categories of individuals from political
participation based on their ideological views. Citing the 1959 Santiago
termined result." Id.
155. See INTER-AM. C.H.R., Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile,
OEA/ser. L./V/II.66, doc. 7 (1985) (declaring the right of citizens to political
participation).
156. See id. at 270-82 (analyzing events since the 1980 plebiscite and concluding
the plebiscite lacked popular support).
157. See id. at 283 (discussing the need for a democratic government "arising from
free, secret, and informed elections, with all the participants having equal access to the
media and whose results genuinely express the will of the people"). Id.
158. See IACHR 1986-87 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 98, at 19 (setting forth
the necessary conditions for an acceptable election or plebiscite).
159. See id. at 220-21 (drawing on the Episcopal Conference of Chile issuing a
declarative entitled "In the Service of Peace," on August 13, 1987, in establishing the
conditions for acceptable elections).
160. Id. at 218. The Law of Political Parties, article 18 of the Chilean Constitution
states: "no member of the armed forces, or of the public security, or law enforcement
agencies, officials, and employees of the various levels of the judiciary, the Election
Board (Tribunal Calificado de Elecciones), the Electoral Service, or labor or guild leaders may be members of any 'political party.'" Id.
161. Id. at 250. Title I of the Nicaraguan Constitution, article 5 states: "political
pluralism ensures the existence and participation of all political organizations in the
economic, political and social affairs of the country, without ideological restrictions,
except for those who seek a return to the past or advocate the establishment of a similar political system." Id.
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Declaration,1 62 the Commission suggested that the use of political proscription conflicts with the American democratic system.c 3
Some petitions to the Commission also concern the right to political
participation. In three cases now pending, petitioners presented substantial evidence of election fraud that affected both the process and
the results. Mr. Garber cited a number of situations that the Commission could pursue if it were petitioned to do so. Despite strong jurisprudential reasons for the Commission to resolve the issues presented in
political participation cases, they pose difficult practical and political
problems relating to the Commission's willingness to investigate and
issue a resolution concerning an issue relating to the legitimacy of an
OAS member government.'" They point to a need for the Commission
to consider alternative mechanisms.
Mr. Garber suggested two options for resolving such inherently difficult cases. First, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights could address certain issues relating to the right to political participation. The
Court could, for instance, review the permissible types of political proscription and the permissible periods of delay a government may impose before holding an election.165 Second, the OAS could establish a
new organ, parallel to the Commission, that would only handle elections; i.e., an Inter-American Commission on Elections. As more states
in the hemisphere move toward a democratic form of government, the
Commission must confront questions of what constitutes democratic
government and what constitutes free and genuine elections.
162. Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Final Act
(Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, 1960) OEA/ser. C./1.5, The Declaration
of Santiago, Chile, at 4-5 (noting that "[t]he systematic use of political proscription is
contrary to American democratic order"). Id.
163. IACHR 1986-87 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 98, at 216-17, 252 (suggesting
that the exclusion of certain classes of persons is incompatible with the democratic
system).
164. See Farer, supra note 99, at 119-23 (summarizing the Commission as an institutional anomaly). The Organization of American States created the Commission to
monitor the compliance of the states with the idealistic nonobligating statements of
intent found in the OAS Charter and instruments. Id. Governments deviating from the
ideals view the Commission as a source of harassment and interference. Id.
165. See American Convention, supra note 6, art. 23, para. l(b) (requiring that
elections be held on a periodic basis); Declaration, supra note 76, art. XX (same).
According to article 23 of the Convention, all citizens have the right to participate in
governmental and civic activities. American Convention, supra note 6, art. 23, para. 1.
The government may regulate these rights only on the basis of age, nationality, residence, language, education, civil and mental capacity, or sentencing by a competent
court in criminal proceedings. Id. art. 23, para. 2.
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THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

Steven Tullberg'66 explained the role of indigenous peoples in the
Inter-American system. Many of the indigenous peoples167 of the hemisphere do not regard the right to participate in national elections as one
of their fundamental human rights. Rather, they hold as fundamental
the right to receive recognition from the states of the world, to govern
themselves according to their own laws, and to control the land and
resources upon which their ways of life depend.'6 8 They see the state as
an entity that has forced itself upon them against their will and without
regard to their right to self-determination, a right guaranteed under
both the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights169 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.170
Although the Commission has had some involvement in the rights of
indigenous peoples, 17 1 the United Nations took the lead in addressing

the general issue by establishing the Working Group on Indigenous
166.

Mr. Tullberg is a Staff Attorney with the Indian Law Resource Center.

167. See infra notes 193-97 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of
the term "peoples"). This article uses the term in much the same way that the United
Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations and the International Labour Organization does.
168. Mr. Tullberg, speaking as a panelist at the conference, noted that a strong
consensus exists among Indian peoples; that the relationships between them and the
dominant states in the hemisphere should be based on a principle of agreement; that
power alone is not sufficient to justify the nonconsensual assertion of governmental authority over indigenous peoples. See infra notes 181-84 and accompanying text (discussing the consensus of indigenous peoples expressed in the proposed declaration of
principles). See generally Barsch, "Indigenous Peoples: An Emerging Object of International Law," 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 369 (1986); INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ISSUES, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: A GLOBAL QUEST FOR JUSTICE (1987); Roy & Alfredson, Indigenous Rights: The Literature Explosion, 13
TRANSNAT'L PERSP. 19-24 (1987).
169. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR], reprinted in 6
I.L.M. 360 (1967).
170. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature,
Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/
6316 (1967) [hereinafter ICCPR], reprintedin 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967). The right of selfdetermination gives all peoples the right to determine freely their political status as
well as to pursue their economic, social and cultural development. Id. Although the
United Nations Charter, articles I and 55, mentions self-determination as a political
principle, the two Covenants are the only international human rights instruments that
proclaim self-determination as a right. Humphrey, Political and Related Rights, in I
HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

171, 171 (T. Meron ed. 1984).

171. See infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text (discussing the work of the
Commission on human rights problems of Indians in Nicaragua).
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Populations in 1982.11 Within the United Nations human rights hierarchy, the Working Group ranks below the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, which in turn
ranks below the Commission on Human Rights and the Economic and
Social Council. Like the Sub-Commission, the Working Group consists
of experts who serve in their individual capacities.173 The Working
Group meets annually in Geneva, Switzerland for five working days
prior to the annual sessions of the Sub-Commission.' 7 ' The Working
Group operates with a substantial degree of openness, a unique characteristic among United Nations organs. Nongovernmental and indigenous representatives, regardless of whether a representative has an affiliation with an NGO with consultative status, have authority to present
both oral and written statements. This openness, in conjunction with
the intense interest of indigenous peoples and their representatives, contributes to the high levels of attendance that have characterized the
Working Group sessions.' 76
The Working Group has a two-part mandate: (1) to review developments pertaining to the human rights of indigenous populations; and
172. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21 Add.8. The Sub-Commission on the Pre-

vention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities proposed the creation of the
Working Group in its Resolution 2 (XXXIV) of September 8. 1981. Id. The SubCommission based the proposal largely on the recommendations of Special Rapporteur
Jos6 Martinez Cobo, in Study on the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous
Populations.The Commission on Human Rights endorsed the proposal in resolution
1982/19 of March 10, 1982. The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) then
adopted resolution 1982/34 of May 7, 1982 that authorized the Sub-Commission to
establish the Working Group. Id.
173. See Van Boven, Protection of Human Rights through the United Nations
System, in HUMAN RGMrrs PRACTICE, supra note 12 (discussing the hierarchy of the
United Nations); Sohn, Human Rights: Their Implementation and Supervision by the
United Nations, 2 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 369 (T. Meron ed. 1984)
(same). The Working Group has five members, one from each of the five regions of the
world as defined by the United Nations.
174. United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Problem of Discrimination
Against Indigenous Populations, U.N.E.S.C. (Agenda Item 10) at 3, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/Sub.2/1987/22 (1987) [hereinafter Working Group Report]. As of the date of
the Conference, the Working Group had conducted five sessions on an annual basis,
except that no session took place in 1986, because of United Nations funding problems.
Id. at 6. In 1986, however, the NGOs sponsored a meeting on indigenous peoples in
Geneva that year. Id. The sixth session was conducted in August. 1988. See infra notes
182, 184 and 196 (discussing the work of the sixth session).
175. Id. at 3-5. Approximately 370 individuals participated in the fifth session, held
in August 1987. Id. at 5. The Working Group Report lists the states and organizations
with which these individuals were affiliated. These included 33 NGOs with consultative
status (including 10 NGOs specifically identified with indigenous peoples); 79 NGOs
without consultative status (including 51 specifically identified with indigenous peoples); 27 member states of the United Nations; two national liberation movements; and
the Holy See. Id.
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(2) to develop new standards for the protection of these rights."'
To fulfill the first part of its mandate, the Working Group accepts
and discusses information that indigenous peoples submit regarding alleged violations of their human rights under existing instruments. The
Working Group does not have the capacity to treat the complaints formally, nor the competence to resolve them. The Working Group uses
the complaints to determine the adequacy of existing instruments, standards, and enforcement mechanisms. 7 Generally, members of the
Working Group find the existing instruments, standards, and mechanisms inadequate, 7 8 although some exceptional cases exist.' 79 The
Working Group devotes a substantial amount of attention to the current project of the International Labour Organization (ILO): revising
the ILO Convention 107.180 The ILO Convention is the only international instrument specifically concerned with the rights of indigenous
peoples.
To fulfill the second part of its mandate, the Working Group, in its
fifth session, approved preliminary wording of fourteen draft princi176. Id. at 3. The mandate of the Working Group instructs the Group to review
developments that pertain to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous populations. Id. Following the mandate, the Working
Group analyzes information that the Secretary General requests annually from governments, specialized agencies, regional intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations in consultative status, particularly those of indigenous peoples.
After analysis of these materials, the Working Group submits its conclusions to the
Sub-Commission, bearing in mind the report of the Special Rapporteur of the SubCommission. Id.
The mandate also provides that the Working Group incorporate the evolution of
standards concerning the rights of indigenous populations, including the similarities
and the differences in the situations and aspirations of indigenous populations throughout the world. Id.
177. Id. at 8. The complaints represent situations of deep concern to indigenous
peoples. Id.
178. Id. at 12. Members of the Working Group expressed the need for additional
international standards for the protection of indigenous peoples. Id.
179. See United Nations Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 24/1977
(July 30, 1981), in SELECTED DECiSiONS

UNDER

THE OPTIONAL

PROTOCOL, at 83,

U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1981) (discussing the case of one indigenous person
against the government of Canada, pursuant to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights); see also United Nations Human Rights
Committee, Communication No. 167/1984, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/30/D/167/1984
(July 27, 1987) (discussing another communication that the chief of the Lubicon Lake
Band of Cree Indians brought against Canada under the Optional Protocol). The
Human Rights Committee decided that it will admit this communication, at least with
respect to some of the allegations. Id.
180. International Labour Office, Report VI (1), Partial Revision of the Indigenous
and Tribal Populations Convention, 1957 (No. 107) (1987) [hereinafter ILO Report].
Indigenous peoples and others have widely criticized Convention 107 for its integrationist approach. Id. at 9. The ILO based its decision to revise the convention on the recognition that this criticism is well-founded. Id.
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pies.1 1l It also authorized the Chairman/Rapporteur to prepare a full
draft text of principles and preambulary paragraphs for the Working
Group to insert into a future declaration on indigenous rights, prior to
the sixth session in 1988.182 The report of the fifth session includes not
only the draft principles that the Working Group has approved, but
also the draft principles that the representatives of indigenous peoples
proposed to the Working Group. 183 Although the Working Group and
the representatives agree in some significant areas, they have not yet
reached agreement in other fundamental areas including self-determination and/or autonomy and the control of land and resources.1
Mr. Tullberg stated that the Inter-American system has had no similar focus on indigenous rights. 85 The Commission has, however, addressed issues concerning indigenous peoples in the context of a number
of cases that have come before it. One such case involves the Miskito,
181. Working Group Report, supra note 174, at 12, 17-18. The Working Group
believed that additional draft principles would facilitate the work of the Group. Id. at
17. The draft principles that the Working Group tentatively approved appear in the
Working Group Report as Annex II. Id. at 23-24.
182. Id. at 22. The Working Group charged the Chairman/Rapporteur with the
task of preparing draft principles for insertion into future declarations that would provide a basis for discussion on new standards. Id.; see also United Nations Commission
on Human Rights, Draft Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on its Thirty-ninth Session, U.N.E.S.C. (Agenda
Item 16) at 3-4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/L. I l/Add.3 (1987) [hereinafter SubCommission Draft Report (Fifth Session)] (discussing how the Sub-Commission,
through Resolution 1987/16, approved this recommendation of the Working Group).
At its sixth session, in August 1988, the Working Group considered a revised draft
declaration, comprised of 28 principles. No formal action was taken on this draft.
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Draft Report of the Sub-Commission
on Prevention of Discriminationand Protection of Minorities on its Fortieth Session,
U.N.E.S.C. (Agenda Item 12), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/ 1988/25 (1988) [hereinafter Sub-Commission Draft Report (Sixth Session)].
183. Working Group Report, supra note 174, at 30-32. The Working Group has
recommended that the United Nations General Assembly declare the year 1992 to be
the "International Year of Indigenous Rights." Id. at 22. The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities has approved this recommendation, changing the wording to "International Year of the World's Indigenous Populations." Res. No. 1987/15, Sub-Commission Draft Report (Fifth Session), supra note
182, at 2.
184. Working Group Report, supra note 174, at 14-16. See also ILO Report,
supra note 180, at 44-75 (discussing the importance of land in the preservation of the
cultures of indigenous peoples). The draft set of principles as prepared during the sixth
session contains several provisions that would establish rights of indigenous peoples to
autonomy over their land and natural resources. Sub-Commission Draft Report (Sixth
Session), supra note 182, at 3-5.
185. Mr. Tullberg also acknowledged a study that another participant mentioned
that was conducted under contract with the Commission. See S. DAvIs, LAND RjGHTS
AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: THE ROLE OF THE OAS INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS (1988) lforthcoming] (summarizing the reports and decisions of the
Commission that address issues of concern to indigenous peoples).
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Sumo, and Rama Indians and the government of Nicaragua. 8 ' The
Commission received praise for its efforts to mediate this dispute and to
reach a friendly settlement. Following the failure to reach a friendly
settlement, it released its report documenting the human rights of the
Indian people in Nicaragua. 18 7 As a result, the government released
several hundred people from imprisonment and commenced negotiations with the Indians.' 88
Mr. Tullberg criticized the Commission's report on the following
grounds: (1) its findings on the issue of forced relocation of populations;
(2) its discussion of the issue of self-determination; and (3) its delay in
releasing a report after the friendly settlement proceedings broke down.
The Americas Watch criticized the Commission for releasing the report too soon. The contradictory criticism on the timing of the report
illustrates a problem concerning human rights publicity. Despite the
need for publicity about human rights problems, too much publicity, or
publicity at an inappropriate time, can have a counterproductive effect.
The individuals and groups involved in such publicity must therefore
exercise judgment and coordinate efforts.
Mr. Tullberg challenged not only the Commission, but also the wider
community of human rights advocates. He commended the Commission for not supporting the position of the Nicaraguan government in
its claims of military necessity for the forced relocation of the Miskito
and other Indians. He did criticize the Commission, however, for not
challenging these claims strongly enough. He then exhorted human
rights advocates to scrutinize such cases closely, to discover the "real"
reasons for the states' actions. He called upon advocates to challenge
politically motivated relocations, e.g., those intended to eliminate perceived threats to the maintenance of power or to distribute the benefits
of resource exploitation to political supporters. Mr. Tullberg noted that
186. See INTER-AM. C.H.R., REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS OF A
SEGMENT OF THE NICARAGUAN POPULATION OF MISKITO ORIGIN I, OEA/ser. L./V/

11.62, doc. 26 (1984) [hereinafter MISKITo REPORT] (discussing the project of the
Commission in Nicaragua). The human rights problems of the indigenous population of
Nicaragua's Atlantic coast represented one of the major topics of the sessions of the
Commission from 1981 to 1983. Id.
187. INTER-AM. C.H.R., SPECIAL REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
OF THE MISKITO INDIANS IN NICARAGUA 1, OEA/ser. L./V/I1.56, doc. 11 (1982). The
report analyzes human rights of the Nicaraguan Miskito Indians on the Atlantic coast.
Id.
188. Mr. Tullberg continued by saying the most recent development is the negotiations of preliminary accords between the government and the Indians. These accords
were signed a short time after the Conference. Basic Preliminary Accords Between the
government of Nicaragua and the Organization YATAMA Resulting from Dialogue
from January 25-February 2, 1988 (signed Feb. 2, 1988) (on file with The American
University Journal of International Law & Policy).

1988]

HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE

when a government proposes to use force in relocating an indigenous
people, it will invariably violate a number of human rights, including
the deprivation of freedom of religion,189 of culture, 10 and of the
" '
means of subsistence.19

189. See Working Group Report, supra note 174, at 9 (discussing deprivation of
freedom of religion). Three of the draft principles that indigenous peoples proposed to
the Working Group specifically call for protection of sacred sites. Id. at 30-31; see
generally Federal Agencies Task Force, American Indian Religious Freedom Act Report, Pub. L. No. 95-341 (1979) [hereinafter AIRFA report] (discussing the distinctive
nature of traditional tribal religions in a report mandated under section 2 of the Ameri-

can Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 (AIRFA), Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469
(codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982)). One of the fundamental distinctions

between traditional tribal religions of North American Indians and the dominant religions of the world is that tribal religions are integrally based on the natural environment in which Indian peoples live; sacred properties exist throughout a tribe's territory
and the tribe can perform certain kinds of ceremonies only at specific sacred sites.
AIRFA Report at 10-11. Article 12, paragraph I of the American Convention on
Human Rights declares, "Everyone has the right to freedom ... of religion." American
Convention, supra note 6, art. 12, para. 1.A state may limit this right by law only
when necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals, or the rights or freedoms of others. Id. para. 3. Thus, the forced relocation of Indian peoples from their
sacred sites violates article 12 unless justified in accordance with paragraph 3. See
Barsch, The Illusion of Religious Freedomfor Native Americans, 65 0R.L. REV. 363,
387-91 (1986) (discussing the failure of the United States Supreme Court to treat
Native American sacred sites as religious); Stambor, Manifest Destiny and Indian Religious Freedom, Sequoyah, Badoni and the Drowned Gods, 10 Am.INDIAN L. REV.
59, 59 (1982) (same); Suagee, American Indian Religious Freedom and Cultural Resources Management: Protecting Mother Earth's Caretakers, 10 Abi. INDIAN L. REV.
1, 1 (1982) (discussing the rights of Indian peoples in the United States); Note, Native
Americans' Access to Religious Sites: Underprotected Under the Free Exercise
Clause?, 26 B.C.L. REV. 463, 483-90 (1985) (same); Note, Native American Free Exercise Rights to the Use of Public Lands, 63 B.U.L. REV. 141, 151 (1983) (same);
Note, The First Amendment and the American Indian Religious Freedom Act: An
Approach to ProtectingNative American Religion, 71 IOWA L. REV. 869, 877 (1986)
(discussing the possible positive impact of AIRFA on respect for Native American religions); Note, American Indian Religious Sites and Government Development: A Conventional Analysis in an Unconventional Setting, 85 MICH. L. REV. 771, 791-95
(1987) (discussing the failure of courts to give value to Native American religious
sites); Note, Indian Religious Freedom and Governmental Development of Public
Lands, 94 YALE L.J. 1447, 1453-57 (1985) [hereinafter Religious Freedom and Governmental Development] (same).
190. Working Group Report, supra note 174, at 9. Indian cultures have developed
a very close, spiritual relationship with the natural environment. AIRFA Report, supra
note 189, at 11. The forced relocation of Indian peoples from the land of their cultures
and economic systems has resulted, in many instances, in severe cultural disintegration.
Religious Freedom and Governmental Development, supra note 189, at 1448. Although no provision in the American Convention specifically protects the right of indigenous peoples to preserve their culture, such a right could be derived from article 12.
See American Convention, supra note 6, art. 12 (guaranteeing freedom of religion).
Indian people believe their culture and religion are synonymous. AIRFA Report, supra
note 189, at 8-12. "Cultural development" is specifically included in article I of both
International Covenants. ICCPR, supra note 170, at 52; ICESCR, supra note 169, at
49.

191. Both International Covenants state, in part, "[i]n no case may a people be
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The Commission received criticism for making overly broad and conclusory remarks regarding the issue of self-determination. The Miskito
Indians argued that article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil
1 92
and Political Rights guarantees them the right to self-determination.
The Commission rejected this argument, without critical analysis, concluding that the Miskito Indians do not fall within the definition of
"peoples" under article I of the Covenant, and thus are not entitled to
the right of self-determination.1 93 The Commission based its decision
on the grounds that the majority of states that took part in the United
Nations General Assembly debate did not intend for the term "peoples" to include indigenous peoples."9 ' The concern of the Commission
was that if a state recognizes that an indigenous people has a right to
self-determination, the people may choose full independence.19 Moredeprived of its means of subsistence." ICCPR, supra note 170, art. 1, para. 2;
ICESCR, supra note 169, art. 1, para. 2. Indian peoples derive their means of subsistence from their land, and forced relocation may deprive them of such means of subsistence. ILO Report, supra note 180, at 44-45. No provision in the American Convention
parallels this language from the Covenants.
192. See Working Group Report, supra note 174, at 30 (citing the right of selfdetermination, as stated in article I of both Covenants).
193. MISKITO REPORT, supra note 186, at 78-81.
194. Id. In its report, the Commission recognizes that the majority of states has
long held the position that the right of self-determination arises only in the context of
decolonization. Id. at 78-81 (citing UN General Assembly debates of 1952 and the
adoption in 1960 of Resolution 1514 (XV) on the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples). The Commission also relied on Resolution 2625 (XXV), entitled Declaration on the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations Among States. This resolution states, in part "that the
establishment of a sovereign and independent state, free association or integration with
an independent state or acquisition of any other freely chosen political status by a
people constitutes that people's means of exercising ,the right of self-determination."
MISKITO REPORT, supra note 186, at 80; United Nations Declarations of Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations Among States in Accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (1970) at 121. The Commission stated that the establishment of the state of Nicaragua constituted an act of
self-determination for all of the people within the territory of Nicaragua, including
Indians. The Commission further stated that, in light of the Resolution, the absence of
Indians' right of autonomy did not give the government of Nicaragua a right to force
complete assimilation of these Indians. Id.
Thus, the fundamental concern of states seems to be the integrity of their claims
over territory. Id.; see Humphrey, supra note 170, at 171, 196 (stating that the decision to include self-determination in the Covenants was aimed at the colonial powers
even though the drafters were convinced that this could prevent those powers from ever
ratifying the Covenants). Id. at 196. Humphrey asserts that the members of the United
Nations were not only concerned with colonial peoples; rather, he argues that, while the
Political and Economic Covenants contain no definition of the word "peoples," the
General Assembly clearly did not mean to include only colonial peoples in that term.
Id.
195. ILO Report, supra note 180, at 15-16. Many indigenous peoples would accept
a reasonable measure of autonomy within an existing state. Id.

1988]

HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE

over, the movement for indigenous self-determination challenges the le-

gitimacy of state claims to sovereignty over the indigenous peoples and,
in some cases, ownership of their traditional territories.9 16 The Indian

peoples, however, do not accept the legal doctrines that they perceive as
racist and that rationalize the raw assertion of power. Rather, they

view self-determination as a relationship to the states that must be
based on consent. The Working Group and the ILO both acknowledge
the absurdity of refraining from describing indigenous populations as
"peoples" in order to avoid the human rights implications of the
term. " " The Working Group and the ILO have focused instead on the

issue of defining "self-determination" in the context of indigenous
peoples.

Mr. Tullberg offered three recommendations to the Commission and
the human rights community at large. First, he maintained that the
Commission and others should become involved with the UN Working

Group in setting standards and in revising ILO Convention 107. Second, when confronted with Indian human rights issues, the Commission

should expand its investigations and analyses, and should conduct outreach activities in the rural communities where Indian peoples live.

Similarly, human rights advocates need to overcome their "urban
bias." 198 Third, the Commission and all human rights organizations
196. Working Group Report, supra note 174, at 9, 14-16. The indigenous peoples
proposed principle number 6 which states that "[d]iscovery, conquest, settlement on a
theory of terra nullius and unilateral legislation are never legitimate bases for States to
claim or retain the territories of indigenous nations or peoples." Id. at 30. The draft set
of principles prepared during the sixth session of the Working Group incorporates this
language in large part. Sub-Committee Draft Report (Sixth Session) supra note 182,
at 4. See Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 4, 31 (Advisory Opinion of Oct. 16) (rejecting a
Spanish claim of sovereignty based on terra nullius because at the time of the Spanish
conquest the land had people and a thriving organization). See E. COHEN, HANDBOOK
OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 47-70, 471-500 (1982) (discussing the doctrine of discovery
and other theories for the assertion of sovereignty and/or ownership over the lands of
American Indians and the legal principles regarding tribal land ownership under the
law of the United States); see also Note, Rethinking the Trust Doctrine in Federal
Indian Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 422, 428-39 (1984) (arguing that the Trust Doctrine
requires Native Americans to substantially govern themselves); Berman, The Concept
of Aboriginal Rights in the Early Legal History of the United States, 27 BUFFALO L.
REV. 637, 638 (1978) (discussing the treatment of American Indians during the Marshall court); Comment, Land and the Forest-Dwelling South American Indian: The
Role of National Law, 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 759, 766-72 (1978) (discussing how national laws dispossessed South American Indians of their native lands).
197. Working Group Report, supra note 174, at 3, 9, 30-31 (using the terms
"populations" and "peoples" interchangeably); I LO Report, supra note 180. at 31 (explaining the desire of various indigenous representatives to use the term "peoples").
198. In the question and answer portion of this panel discussion, Professor Robert
Goldman reiterated this point, noting that at least two NGOs, Americas Watch and
the Washington Office on Latin America, have shown a recent shift in emphasis toward
the concerns of indigenous peoples in rural areas. See T. BERGER, VILLAGE JOURNEY:
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should develop affirmative action programs and should institutionalize
their relationships with Indian organizations. The Commission as an
inter-governmental organization cannot lead the movement for the
rights of indigenous peoples. The human rights community must therefore take the leadership role, in cooperation with indigenous peoples'
organizations. 199
C.

AMNESTY LAWS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS

The panel addressed the use of amnesty laws for the protection of
human rights violators from prosecution. Professor Robert K.
Goldman 200 spoke as an expert on amnesty laws. He explained that
amnesty laws sometimes form part of the agreement through which a
military government agrees to transfer power to civilian authorities.
For instance, when a military government loses popular support, it will
often enact amnesty laws to maintain power. The use of amnesty or
self-amnesty laws, however, undermines the system for the protection
of human rights.
Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, and Uruguay have enacted various forms of amnesty laws that, as a practical matter, are either
primafacie violations of articles 2 and 25 of the American Convention,
or else violate these articles as applied. 0 1 Under most amnesty laws the
state waives the criminal jurisdiction of human rights violators. This
(comparing the rural and urban concerns of indigenous peoples). Judge Berger observed that
the search of Europeans and their descendants for wealth from the New World continues to this day, in the search for oil and minerals in Alaska. Id. at 174. The success of
industrialized nations established a model for economic development which the United
States sees as a model the Third World should emulate. Id. at 175. Most native peoples, however, do not wish to assimilate for fear of losing autonomy. Id. at 176. Native
peoples insist that their culture and, therefore, their values, economy, and way of life,
are still the vital force in their lives. Id.
199. Mr. Tullberg listed some of the major indigenous peoples' organizations of the
hemisphere: Organizaci6n Nacional Indigena de Colombia [ONIC], Confederaci6n Indigena Nacional de Amazonia Ecuatoriana [CONFENIAE], Asociaci6n Internica de
Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana [AIDESEP], Uniao das Nacbes Indigenas [UNI], and
the Inuit Circumpolar Conference.
200. Mr. Goldman is a Professor of Law and Louis C. James Scholar at the Washington College of Law, The American University.
201. See American Convention, supra note 6, art. 2 (providing that states must
undertake to adopt legislation to ensure the rights and freedoms of the Convention in a
non-discriminatory way). Article 25 (Right to Judicial Protection) guarantees the right
to a simple and prompt recourse before a competent court for protection against acts
that violate one's fundamental rights under laws of the state concerned or the Convention. Id. art. 25, para. 1. Article 25 requires states to ensure that competent legal authorities determine the individual's rights. Id. art. 25, para. 2(a). It further requires
states to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy, and to ensure that the competent
authorities enforce the remedies, Id. art. 25, para. 2(b)-(c).
THE REPORT OF THE ALASKA NATIVE REVIEW COMMISSION 173, 183 (1985)
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waiver, in combination with the nature of civil-law systems, allows a
state to preclude victims, their representatives, or their families from
seeking or obtaining any domestic legal redress for violations of rights
protected by the American Convention. Similarly, the victims cannot
recover for violations of comparable rights in the Covenants or other
treaties. Advisory opinions of the Inter-American Court indicate that
obligations of states party to the OAS Charter, as well as to the American Convention, extend to compliance with mandatory provisions of
common article 3 or Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions. Professor
Goldman asserted that these amnesty laws violate the most basic norms
of international jus cogens. Under no circumstances during times of
peace, low-level or high-level internal conflict, or international armed
conflict, may the government of a state murder, torture, rape, or force
the disappearance of people.
The majority of the human rights community has not addressed amnesty laws, in much the same way that courts have declined to address
acts of state or political questions. When civilian leaders agree to an
amnesty law as a condition or price for democratic elections, many in
the human rights community do not challenge the bargain. This "political question" approach undercuts the essence of the Inter-American
system for the protection of human rights. For the system to work,
states must respect and ensure the human rights guarantees set forth in
the American Convention and the American Declaration. States parties
to the Convention have an obligation to enact and enforce effective domestic protection and judicial remedies. By negotiating amnesty with
its military, a government engages in an "auto coup," i.e., it surrenders
to the armed forces part of its authority and part of its function of
executing laws. If a government allows members of the armed forces to
retire unpunished, little incentive remains for the military to refrain
from acts against human rights should the military gain power in the
future.
Professor Goldman suggested that because of political constraints on
the Commission, the Court can play the more important role in dealing
with problems of amnesty. In addition, NGOs should try to bring more
cases before the Commission and also before the United Nations
Human Rights Committee. Because amnesty laws preclude legal remedies, the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies does not arise. Professor Goldman mentioned an example of such a potential case, suggesting that civilian authorities in Uruguay request from the Court an
advisory opinion on the compatibility of amnesty laws and the obligations of states parties under international law. Professor Goldman suggested that, if the civilian authorities fail to make such a request, the
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Commission could pose the question to the Court and thus seek to establish the permissible scope of amnesty laws. The establishment of
such parameters would strengthen democratic leaders during periods of
transition of power. A leader could invoke international law to reject
the demands of the military regime for amnesty, and the Court would
thus become "the single best vehicle" for establishing parameters.
Professor Goldman concluded that granting amnesty to the perpetrators of violations of human rights is contrary to international law and
frustrates the entire international human rights system. Professor
Goldman concluded by saying:
We really fail ourselves, as agents of the international legal system, and essentially as advocates for human rights, if we continue to ignore the problem because of perceived political difficulties or discomfort that may be caused for certain leaders who are helping to re-establish or build democracy. I do not believe
that you build democracy by compromising on issues like this.

V. WHO USES THE COURT AND THE COMMISSION?
HOW TO EXPAND AND FACILITATE THEIR USE? HOW TO
INCREASE THEIR VISIBILITY AND IMPACT?
Throughout the conference, panelists and participants voiced concern
about the need for more publicity on human rights matters and the
need for the human rights community to assume the burden of rectifying the situation. The final panel focused on this topic. In their remarks, panelists continued to question the overall effectiveness of
human rights organizations.
The first speaker, Mario del Carril,202 stated that although human
rights violations receive fairly significant news coverage, the media devotes less attention to the institutional responses to the violations. The
reporting of human rights abuses remains vitally important as a force
for constructive change, but the public must also hear how institutions
respond to the abuses. This information would increase awareness of
the problem and help people develop a sense of justice and a sense that
the rule of law is important.
Mr. del Carril looked at examples of news coverage of governmental
wrongdoing, including coverage of the trial of members of three juntas
in Argentina that involved a confrontation between military and civilian institutions. 0 3 In other news coverage, the Argentine national press
reported a visit of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
202. Mr. del Carril is the Press Attach6 to the Embassy of Argentina.
203. To illustrate this point, Mr. del Carril read random passages from several
articles from the Argentine press.

1988]

HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE

as an affront to Argentine sovereignty. Mr. del Carril characterized
this coverage as a "nationalistic reaction." He concluded that an emphasis on the confrontational element in human rights matters undermines any educational function the news media may perform regarding
the promotion of the institutions of the Inter-American human rights
system. Rather than helping to develop an understanding of the rule of
law, this type of news coverage reinforces skepticism about the possibility of adequate redress of human rights abuses. A skeptical public
tends to pay less attention to the institutions and their procedures. 2 In
light of this, the Commission must ensure distribution of its reports in
the countries that are the subjects of the reports.
The second speaker, John Goshko,20 5 asserted that although the
Court and the Commission are worthy institutions, they remain ineffecfive because they lack the support and cooperation of OAS member
states. Mr. Goshko suggested that NGOs concerned with results, in
terms both of achieving redress for victims of human rights abuse and
of improving the effectiveness of the Court and the Commission, should
emphasize political strategies rather than legal strategies.
The third speaker, Alexander Wilde,20 8 reported on the experiences
of a Washington-based human rights NGO with the Commission and
the Court. The cases involved the governments of both Colombia and
Peru, examples of "democraduras." These are governments that are
formally democratic with a measure of political openness and competition, which are nevertheless subject to serious human rights violations
traceable to the military, the police, and the militia. Mr. Wilde, to illustrate practical problems in gathering information for petitions, posed
the following problem. In 1983, an NGO used a standard form to collaborate with a local NGO to investigate conditions in Colombia. The
NGO succeeded in identifying a large number of violations and submitted the information to the Commission. The Commission was unable to
use the information, however, because the Washington-based NGO
could not provide verification.
In light of this experience, the NGO used a different approach in
Peru. In 1984, it assigned a staff member to travel through the country
taking testimony from a great many witnesses. After consulting an204.

Mr. del Carril suggested that an approach to overcoming this paradox would

be to attempt to minimize the confrontational element in news coverage. Without offering a way to achieve such minimization, he suggested that a solution might be found

through a detailed study of the actual press coverage of institutional responses to governmental abuse.
205. Mr. Goshko is a reporter for The Washington Post.
206. Mr. Wilde is the Director of the Washington Office on Latin America.
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other human rights NGO,207 the original NGO selected and developed
four cases and brought them before the Commission. The Commission
transmitted the petitions to the Peruvian government, 20 8 and the government responded to the Commission. The following year, the NGO
staff member returned to Peru, re-interviewed many people, and then
submitted additional information to the Commission. Despite this effort, the mission eventually failed, in Mr. Wilde's opinion, because of
the difficulty of maintaining a working relationship between the Washington-based NGO and the human rights organizations in Peru. While
stressing the importance of cooperation between international NGOs
and local human rights organizations, Mr. Wilde noted the need for the
international NGOs to take account of the constraints faced by local
organizations. He concluded by calling on human rights organizations
worldwide to strengthen their contacts with the academic community in
an effort to generate systemic analyses of the effectiveness of human
rights advocacy in general and of the work of the Commission and the
Court in particular.
The final speaker, Ken Anderson, 09 reiterated two points: (1) the
need for effective local organizations to monitor and investigate violations of human rights and to advocate legal and political resolutions;
and (2) the need for local groups and international groups to coordinate their efforts. Mr. Anderson considered the "legal professionalization" of the Inter-American human rights system of central importance, but he raised two points of caution. First, as the legal profession
increases its influence on the process, human rights groups may tend to
make decisions about what cases to pursue on the basis of the quantity
and quality of the evidence that is available. Yet in many cases of egregious abuses, especially disappearances, even competent investigation
can turn up little or no legally admissible evidence. If evidence becomes
the primary criterion for determining which cases to pursue, NGOs
may decide that the Commission is not an appropriate forum to consider disappearances.
Second, as petitions to the Commission become longer, more detailed, and couched in legal terms, the Commission may expect legalistic documents and respond more favorably to them. This will be troublesome for local human rights organizations which generally lack both
legal expertise and the resources to prepare detailed petitions. Mr. An207. International Human Rights Law Group.
208. IACHR Regs., supra note 7, art. 34, para. 1(c).
209. Mr. Anderson, formerly of the International Human Rights Law Group, is
currently with the law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell.
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derson suggested that, to alleviate this concern, the Commission should
take an active role in responding to cases submitted by local human
rights organizations. Professor David Weissbrodt, 20 the moderator of
the panel, suggested that with the development of a "two-track" system
the Commission could make effective use of experienced attorneys involved in cases and provide an extra measure of assistance to petitioners not represented by counsel.
VI. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
A final conference report summarized the proceedings of the two
days and the recommendations of the panelists and other participants. Some recommendations evoked the support of several speakers
with no apparent dissent, or very limited dissent, and, thus, appeared to
represent a consensus of the conference. Other recommendations put
forth by individual speakers did not have unanimous backing, although
the conference participants generally agreed on the gravity of each
question and the need for some sort of action. The participants decided
that all the recommendations should be considered as agenda items for
future conferences. The summary below categorizes the conference recommendations according to the entities involved: the General Assembly
of the Organization of American States, the member states of the
OAS, the Commission, the Court, the human rights NGOs, and the
academic community. Many issues, such as the need for funding and
for publicity, involved a number of entities; thus, the recommendations
dealing with them are interrelated.
A. THE OAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Participants generally agreed about the importance of the General
Assembly in promoting human rights and about its limitations caused
by the constraints under which it operates. Many participants called on
the General Assembly to provide more funds and staff for the Commission and for the Court to permit them to expand their activities. Some
participants called on the General Assembly to direct its attention to
new human rights protocols and conventions, particularly in the areas
of economic, cultural, and social rights. Most people agreed that the
210. Mr. Weissbrodt is a Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota School
of Law.

211. Laurence Eisenstein of the law firm of Covington & Burling was the Conference Rapporteur. The recommendations are taken from his report, submitted to the
Seventeenth Regular Session of the General Assembly (Nov. 9, 1987, Washington,
D.C.).
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vague wording in the 1980s of recent General Assembly resolutions on
human rights has compromised their effectiveness.

B.

THE ROLE OF

OAS

MEMBER STATES

Several participants called upon those states that have failed to ratify
the American Convention on Human Rights or to accept the jurisdiction of the Court to remedy their inaction. The assemblage expressed
support for the development of new human rights protocols and conventions in the areas of economic, cultural, and social rights, and the prevention of torture. Moving beyond formalities, several participants
called upon states to assume responsibility for enforcing decisions of
the Commission and the Court on matters within the scope of their
sovereignty and, in matters beyond their sovereignty, to promote
human rights through bilateral relations. One participant suggested the
use of questionnaires as a way of monitoring what individual states
have done to promote human rights in response to communications, reports, and opinions of the Commission and the Court.
C.

IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COMMISSION

A broad consensus evolved for the notion that the Commission
should expand its outreach and publicity activities to the greatest extent its limited resources permit. Such actions would increase the moral
pressure on states to honor the decisions of the Commission, enhance
the prestige and moral authority of the Commission, and contribute to
the public's understanding of human rights. Specific recommendations
covered the issuance of press releases on the actions of the Commission,
the distribution of country reports within the subject countries, and the
enhancement of relationships with the academic community and educational institutions.
A wide-ranging discussion illustrated the tension that arises from the
need of the Commission to balance the benefit of its procedural informality against the need for procedural predictability. Although most
people agreed that flexibility and informality in responding to human
rights abuses, especially in cases of disappearances, contribute to the
effectiveness of the Commission, several participants suggested that the
Commission should revise its regulations to reflect actual rather than
theoretical practice. One panelist argued that the informality of Commission procedures has worked primarily to the benefit of parties who
are represented by experienced counsel. This panelist suggested that
the Commission should focus its attention on providing assistance to
parties who are unrepresented through the establishment of a two-track
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system for petitioning the Commission.
Several panelists commended the Commission for its sensitivity to
the danger of political influence on its decisionmaking, and urged the
Commission to continue to emphasize legal standards rather than political concerns. One panelist recommended that the Commission directly
involve itself in the development of new legal standards for the rights of
indigenous peoples through participation in the sessions of the United
Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations.
D.

IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COURT

A consensus existed on the need for more publicity and outreach regarding the rulings of the Court. Participants deemed this important
because governmental compliance remains largely a function of public
awareness and support. Several participants recommended steps to increase access to the Court, such as broadening the opportunities for
initiating requests for advisory opinions, allowing parties before the
Court to be represented by counsel independent of the Commission,
and establishing a fund to defray the costs of pursuing a claim before
the Court. The American Convention, however, limits the steps that
the Court itself can take in these directions. For example, to allow individual parties to appear before the Court in their own capacities would
require an amendment to the Convention. The Commission, however,
might be able to develop a practice that would approximate individual
representation by using its right to appoint private attorneys to represent the Commission before the Court.
E.

PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS BY NONGOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS

While recognizing that NGOs have limited resources, conference
participants agreed that NGOs should do more to help promote human
rights through the Inter-American system. One recommendation was
that NGOs offer indirect support to the Court and to the Commission
in matters relating to funding and public awareness. NGOs can represent petitioners before the Commission. They can undertake analyses of the Commission and Court, including the development of issues
that member states and the Commission can present to the Court for
advisory opinions. They can also seek and receive funding from private
sources to promote human rights.
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MATTERS REQUIRING FURTHER STUDY

On a number of issues, the participants agreed that the questions
deserve further attention from individuals and institutions in the
human rights community.
1. Proceduralissues
Throughout the conference, the matter of the distribution of cases in
the Inter-American system drew wide attention. The discussion centered on the determination of the kinds of cases that the informal procedure of the Commission should address, the kinds of cases within the
jurisdiction of the Commission that require more formal procedures,
and the cases in which the Court has the more appropriate jurisdiction.
The speakers recognized that generally the Commission is best suited
for fact-finding and the Court for legal analysis. They noted, however,
that in many cases this distinction does not provide a sufficient basis for
a division of responsibilities. The division of responsibility is further
complicated by the emergence of "new" issues related to economic, social, and cultural rights, to elections, and to the rights of indigenous
peoples.
2.

The Effect of Actions by the Commission and the Court

The participants did not reach a consensus on how to make OAS
member states accountable for giving legal and practical effect to decisions of the Commission and the Court. While many believe that states
can be encouraged to raise public consciousness about human rights,
most feel that the matter of enforcing state compliance with international human rights norms is problematic and is likely to remain so.
3. Substantive Issues
The participants recommended further attention to the development
of provisional measures to protect the victims of disappearances and
other such egregious human rights abuses. They also discussed the
topic of state laws that grant amnesty to persons who have committed
human rights abuses. Although one panelist forcefully argued that such
amnesty laws conflict with international jus cogens, no consensus
emerged as to what can be or should be done to prevent the enactment
of such laws and what the role of the Commission and the Court should
be. While many agreed that the right of indigenous peoples is an important subject that needs to be addressed, they achieved no consensus
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on recommendations for action.
CONCLUSION
The participants unanimously concluded that the conference was
worthwhile. Individuals affiliated with OAS states, the Commission,
and the Court, members of the academic community, and representatives of nongovernmental organizations all expressed appreciation for
the opportunity to exchange points of view and engage in constructive
dialogue. All those in attendance agreed that the advancement of the
cause of human rights depends primarily upon public consciousness a growth in people's awareness of the rights to which everyone is entitled by virtue of belonging to the human community and the development of an attitude that civilized nations can no longer tolerate violations of human rights. Conference participants expressed the view that
this particular conference will contribute greatly to the development of
public consciousness and that, through participation in the conference,
they were better prepared to expand their efforts to promote human
rights in the Inter-American community.
POSTSCRIPT
On July 29, 1988, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights found
the Honduran government guilty in the disappearance of Angel Manfredo and Veldsquez Rodriguez. The Court will oversee a settlement
between the government and the family of Veldsquez. A spokesman for
Honduras President Jos6 Azcona Hoyo said, "The Government of Honduras has no option but to respect the judgment fully."2
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